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SUKARNO: RADICAL OR CONSERVATIVE?
INDONESIAN POLITICS 1964-5
Peter C hristian  Hauswedell
The passing o f  the Orde Lama in Indonesia and the death o f  P r e s i ­
dent Sukarno seem too re cen t ,  and p o l i t i c a l  emotions are s t i l l  too 
high to arrive  at a d e f in i t iv e  ch a ra c te r iza t io n  o f  the nature o f  the 
p o l i t i c a l  system and i t s  leader. The apparent con tra d ic t io n s  between 
the id e o lo g ic a l  dynamism and the s o c ia l  conservatism 1 o f  Guided Democ­
racy , the lack o f  con c lu s iv e  evidence about Sukarno’ s f in a l  p o l i t i c a l  
in te n t io n s ,  and the ch a o t ic ,  even a p oca lyp tic  period  b e fore  the sudden 
demise o f  the system a l l  con tr ibu te  to the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  c l a s s i f i c a ­
t io n .  F in a lly ,  the dramatic events around the October 1, 1965 coup 
attempt have d is t ra c te d  our a tten tion  unduly. In Indonesia i t s e l f ,  
the p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere does not yet allow an o b je c t iv e  assessment o f  
the p er iod . Since nearly  a l l  members o f  the present e l i t e  were in one 
way or another deeply involved  in the events o f  that time, there are 
few p u b lica t ion s  about the p er iod ,  and they have been rather polem ica l 
and u n sy stem a tic .2
Any study which con tr ibu tes  to our knowledge o f  Sukarno and Indo­
nesian p o l i t i c s  b e fore  the coup is  th ere fore  more than welcome, and 
John D. Legge’ s recent p o l i t i c a l  biography o f  the former P res id en t3 
is  the f i r s t  ambitious attempt to portray  th is  c e r t a in ly  complex, and 
o ften  con tra d ic to ry  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r .1* Although s o l id  in fa c tu a l
1. Clifford Geertz used these terms in a different context in his afterword: ’’The 
Politics of Meaning” in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 320.
2. See, for example, Pimpinan Redaksi Harian ’’Merdeka,” Tragedi Soekarno (Djakarta: 
Merdeka Press, 1967); Zainal Abidin Djamaris, Taktik § Sistem Kekuasaan Dr. Ir. 
Soekarno (Medan: ” IKDI,” 1970); and S. M. Amin, Indonesia dibawah Rezim ”Demo- 
krasi Terpimpin” (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1967). See also Mochtar Lubis, ’’Mys­
ticism in Indonesian P olit ics ,” Solidarity (Manila), Vol. XI (November-December 
1967), pp. 22-27.
3. J. D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (London: The Penguin Press, 1972).
4. The first  scholarly attempt to analyze Sukarno’ s political development t i l l  1945 
was Bernhard Dahm’ s Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1969). In this essay I will not be concerned with such 
journalistic studies as, for example, Willard A. Hanna’ s Eight Nation-Makers 
(Southeast Asia’ s Charismatic Statesmen) (New York: St. Martin’ s Press, 1964),
where on pp. 1-92 Sukarno was judged solely in terms of conservative-liberal 
Western standards. For an ’’autobiography” of Sukarno see Cindy Adams, Sukarno:
An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), and
the later volume My Friend the Dictator (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967) by 
the same author. For a particular aspect of politics under Sukarno see Donald E. 
Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno’ s Indonesian Revolution (New Haven: 
Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series No. 8, 1966). See also
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m aterial and ca re fu l  in judgment, the authorf s in te rp re ta t io n  o f  Sukar­
no o f f e r s  no major new departure. Rather he fo l low s  the orthodox 
approach which sees Sukarno as a conservative  guardian o f  the even 
more con serv a tiv e -b u rea u cra tic  system o f  Guided Democracy. I t  w i l l  be 
the argument o f  th is  a r t i c l e  that in the l ig h t  o f  the su b sta n tia l 
trend towards the l e f t  in Indonesian domestic p o l i t i c s  in 1964-5 
brought about by a conscious p o l i t i c a l  s h i f t  o f  Sukarno and his 
strengthened a l l ia n c e  with the Indonesian L e ft ,  the la te  President can 
no longer s a fe ly  be seen as a con serv ativ e . He should, on the con ­
tra ry , be seen as a ra d ica l  during the la t e r  per iod  o f  Guided Democ­
racy , s in ce  the p o l i t i c a l  changes set  in motion during those f in a l  
years threatened to undermine the conservative  status quo.
In order to  focus on the debate on whether Sukarno should be con­
s idered  a ra d ica l  or a con serv a tiv e , th is  a r t i c l e  w i l l  only be con ­
cerned with Leggef s evaluation  o f  Sukarnof s p o l i t i c a l  o r ie n ta t io n  and 
h is  ch a ra c te r iza t io n  o f  Guided Democracy. It  w i l l  not attempt to deal 
with h is  biography as a whole. Moreover, i t  is  only f a i r  to s tress  
that those arguments I wish to con test  are advanced by Legge with a l l  
the proper reservation s  o f  ca re fu l  judgment. Likewise I want to put 
forward my in te rp re ta t io n  o f  Sukarno with ce r ta in  reserv a t ion s . A l ­
though I conclude that Sukarno is  b e t te r  viewed as a ra d ica l  and that 
the d ir e c t io n  o f  Guided Democracy was changing, my case w i l l  need spe­
c ia l  argument, f o r  the events o f  October 1, 1965, stopped th is  ra d ica l  
development prematurely; the trend was in terrupted  be fore  i t  had 
brought fundamental changes. The v ic t o r y  o f  the cou n terrevo lu t ion  
assured i t s  t o ta l  rep ress ion .
It  is  expedient to begin by summarizing the arguments which re la te  
to Legge! s evaluation  o f  Sukarno and the nature o f  the p o l i t i c a l  system 
he headed. Although Legge does not s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e fe r  to the fa m il ia r  
concept which views the Indonesian pre-coup power con fig u ra t ion  as a 
t r ia n g le ,  he im p l i c i t ly  fo l low s  i t .  In h is  view, Sukarno is  essen ­
t i a l l y  ba lancing , manipulating, and c o n c i l ia t in g  the opposing fo r ce s  
o f  the Army and the PKI fo r  the ultim ate aim o f  preserving  his own 
p o s i t io n  and pow er.5 Legge! s idea o f  Sukarno as a "b a la n cer” i n f l u ­
ences him to see domestic p o l i t i c s  as a "balancing  a c t " 6 and as a "p e r ­
fo rm a n ce ."7 This ch a ra c te r iza t io n  leads him to the image o f  Sukarno 
as a dalang, and as a manipulator who in the end t r i e s  desperate ly  to 
keep h im self  at the top o f  a con stan tly  s h i f t in g  power base , and who 
loses  co n tro l  when he is  caught up by h is  own momentum.8
To regard Sukarno as a "b a la n cer"  assumes that to the end he is  
uncommitted, has not r e a l ly  taken s id e s ,  and that the t r ia n g le  with
Justus M. van der Kroeffs article, "Sukarno, The Ideologue--A Review Article," 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 2 (Summer 1968), pp. 245-261, and the later ex­
change between Dahm and van der Kroef in Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLII, No. 1 
(Spring 1969), pp. 55-57. An Indonesian scholarly treatment is Alfian, "Dasar2 
Pemikiran Politik Sukarno," Budaja Djaja, No. 40 (September 1971), pp. 544-560, 
based on a review of Dahm!s Sukarno.
5. See Legge, Sukarno, pp. 9, 378, 381-384
6. Ibid., p. 381.
7. Ibid., p. 383.
8. Ibid., pp. 382-383.
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the PKI and the Army is  s t i l l  a working, balanced r e a l i t y .  Such a 
view o f  Sukarno leads Legge to see the P res id en t 's  p o l i t i c s  p rim arily  
from a t a c t i c a l  p e rsp e c t iv e .  Consequently he ch a ra cter izes  Nasakom 
as a mere t a c t i c a l  d e v i c e .9
Another argument centers upon the outcome o f  Sukarno's p o l i c i e s .  
Legge concludes that Sukarno's p o l i c i e s  "whether he knew i t  or not"  
were p ro te c t in g  the conservative  status quo o f  Guided Democracy and 
i t s  corrupt e l i t e , 10 and that i t  is  doubtfu l whether he r e a l ly  wanted 
a fundamental restru ctu r in g  o f  the s o c ia l  o r d e r .11
In order to so lve  the apparent c o n tra d ic t io n  between Sukarno's 
ra d ica l  rh e to r ic  and his presumed conservative  p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e s ,  
Legge proposes that Sukarno may not have been aware o f  h is  m o t iv e s .12 
This judgment seems to imply that d esp ite  an obvious trend to the l e f t  
in the la te  Guided Democracy p er iod ,  i t s  conservative  character  was 
not r e a l ly  changing, and that Sukarno's ta lk  o f  rev o lu t io n  and s o c ia l  
change remained abstract  and was a t a c t i c a l  device  o f  the balancing 
a c t .
Very c lo s e ly  linked to th is  view o f  Guided Democracy i s  the charge 
that i t s  id eo logy  was a "manipulative device  rather than the p resen ta ­
t ion  o f  a plan o f  a c t i o n , "  "a t e s t  o f  orthodoxy" and "a means o f  s e cu r ­
ing c o n fo r m it y ." 13 14 This overlaps c l o s e ly  with C l i f f o r d  Geertz ' view 
o f  id eo logy  as a "smokescreen"1h to conceal r e a l i t y .
In a general way a l l  these po in ts  r e la te  to Sukarno's own view o f  
rev o lu t ion  and s o c ia l  change. Legge asserts  that Sukarno understood 
and talked about r e v o lu t io n  mainly fo r  i t s  s p i r i t u a l  and em otional, 
rather than i t s  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t s , 15 and he seems to agree with those 
who maintain that rev o lu t ion  f o r  Sukarno was "a r h e t o r i c a l  d ev ice "  and 
"a temper o f  m in d ."16 Legge thinks that he had no c le a r  v is io n  o f  
s o c ia l  change and no revo lu t ion ary  program .17 He s ta tes  that Sukarno 
g en era lly  fo llow ed  "vague and a bstract  g o a ls "  rather than " s p e c i f i c  
and p r a c t i c a l  o n e s . " 18
9. Ibid. , p. 348.
10. Ibid. , pp. 8, 353, 383-384.
11. Ibid. , pp. 383-384.
12. See Legge1s qualifications of "whether he knew it  or not" and "whether it  was 
intended to be so or not" (ibid. , pp.. 384 and 8) .
13. Ibid. , p. 353.
14. In his "Ideology as a Cultural System" in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and 
Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 70, Geertz described the place 
of ideology in Indonesian politics as a "smokescreen for failure, a diversion 
to stave o ff  despair, a mask to conceal reality rather than a portrait to 
reveal i t . "
15. Legge, Sukarno, p. 350.
16. Ibid. , p. 8.
17. Ibid. , pp. 8, 350, 383.
18. Ibid. , p. 383; see also p. 353.
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A la s t  major part o f  LeggeTs argument concerns Sukarno’ s r e la t io n  
ship with the PKI, which is  important fo r  an evaluation  o f  the f in a l  
period  o f  Guided Democracy. Although he acknowledges that the absence 
o f  hard evidence makes i t  im possib le  to reach a f in a l  con c lu s ion , he 
argues that Sukarno approved o f  the PKI’ s ’ ’ general temper o f  th ou gh t,” 
but not ” o f  i t s  s o c ia l  programme,” 19 that the President was not intend 
ing to make the party his h e i r , 20 and that he was balancing h is  p a r t ­
nership with the PKI against h is  partnership  with the Army, which he 
( i . e . ,  Legge) seems to regard as s t i l l  i n t a c t . 21 Considering whether 
or not Sukarno’ s moves o f  1964-5 in favor o f  the Left c o n s t i tu te  a 
conscious pro-PKI p o l i c y ,  Legge thinks that they were a redress o f  the 
balance o f  f o r c e s 22 which had weighed against the PKI, because the 
Army reta ined  the monopoly o f  weapons. So he concludes that the PKI 
in 1965 had not come very much nearer to the ’ ’e x e rc is e  o f  genuine 
pow er,” 23 and that, on the contrary , i t  had l o s t  i t s  ’ ’d o c tr in a l  p u rity  
and i t s  revo lu t ion ary  w i l l ” through i t s  l im ited  involvement in govern­
ment and i t s  b id  f o r  P res id en t ia l  p r o t e c t i o n .24
A fter  summarizing Legge’ s arguments, which are advanced by him 
with some q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  I now want to put fo rth  my rather d i f f e r e n t  
in te rp re ta t io n  o f  Sukarno. The g is t  o f  my argument is  that I tend to 
see Sukarno no longer as a ’ ’b a la n c e r ,” but as one con sc iou s ly  taking 
s ides  not only with the PKI, but with a l l  those who were w i l l in g  to 
fo l lo w  h is  more ra d ica l  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the Indonesian Revolution . 
Therefore I see Nasakom as a means to achieve h is  d es ire  fo r  a p ro g re s ­
s i v e - l e f t i s t  d ir e c t io n  o f  the re v o lu t io n ,  rather than as a mere t a c t i ­
ca l device  to keep h im self  in power. In f a c t ,  i f  concern fo r  h is  own 
p o s i t io n  r e a l ly  was his prime m otivation , i t  is  in con ce iva b le  that he 
would r isk  supporting Nasakom desp ite  the form idable res is ta n ce  i t  en­
countered. Sukarno’ s a l l ia n c e  with the PKI was becoming c l o s e r ,  while 
h is r e la t io n sh ip  with the Army appeared to be d is in te g ra t in g  and r i d ­
dled by mutual su sp ic ion s . Moreover, Sukarno was no longer in fundamen 
ta l  u n ity , but rather in growing c o n f l i c t  with the re s t  o f  the e l i t e .  
My in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the la t e r  h a l f  o f  Guided Democracy s tresses  a 
change o f  id e o lo g ic a l  content and a stronger re la t io n s h ip  between 
id eo logy  and p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ,  which in the end tended to undermine 
the conservative  status quo o f  the system. F in a lly ,  Sukarno’ s commit­
ment to rev o lu t ion  and s o c ia l  change, although very id io s y n c r a t ic  and 
gradual because o f  the conservative  nature o f  Indonesian power r e a l i ­
t i e s ,  may have been more serious than his orthodox c r i t i c s  would have 
us b e l ie v e .
I would s tress  that Sukarno’ s domestic p o l i t i c s  in 1964-5 were 
con sc iou s ly  ra d ica l  in d ir e c t io n  much more than would Rex M ortim er.25
19. Ibid ., P- 353.
20. Ibid ., P- 381.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., P‘ 378.
23. Ibid ., P‘ 382.
24. Ibid., P* 381.
25. For this and the following quote, see Rex Alfred Mortimer, ’’The Ideology of the 
Communist Party of Indonesia under Guided Democracy, 1959-1965” (Ph.D. disser­
tation, Monash University, 1970), ch. VI, pp. 59-60.
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Mortimer emphasizes , l ik e  m yself , that the d ir e c t io n  o f  the p o l i t i c a l  p ro ­
cess in la te  Guided Democracy was already undermining the status quo, 
but, l ik e  Legge, he sees in the economic process a conservative  aspect 
o f  the system. His ch a ra c te r iza t io n  o f  the system and Sukarno is  
th ere fore  focused on the co n tra d ic t io n  between conservatism  and " p o l i t  
i c a l  Jacob in ism ,"  to both o f  which Sukarno gave support:
The paradox lies in the fact that, while on the one hand the economic 
process was gradually cristallising in the emergence of an identifi­
able stratum of wealthy, politically  powerful and conservative po li­
tician-bureaucrats, the political process was undermining the security 
of the incipient new ruling class and increasing the possibility of 
a radical, communist-led attack on their privileges. President 
Sukarno not only presided over each of these contradictory processes, 
he gave sustenance to them both. Thus, analyses of the whole system 
which stress the social conservatism of the e lite , and those which 
emphasise the radical Jacobinism of its leader, both have to be taken 
into account; the regime was beset by a profound contradiction, mir­
rored in the personality structure of its President, and the con­
flic ts  inherent in this contradiction were, as we shall see, crucial 
to the crisis that developed in the system in 1965.
Before I su bstantia te  my l in e  o f  argument with more d e t a i l ,  I would 
l ik e  to e laborate  on my approach and comment on what I think are some 
important l im ita t io n s  o f  the orthodox approach.
A b a s ic  weakness o f  the in te rp re ta t io n  o f  Legge and o th e r s 26 is  
that they tend to view Guided Democracy as a u n if ie d  whole, which the 
events o f  1964-5 did not s ig n i f i c a n t ly  change, or demand a new type o f  
an a ly s is .  I f  a d i f fe r e n c e  between the p e r io d s ,  1959 to la te  1963, and 
1964-5 is  perce ived  at a l l ,  then i t  seems that the la t e r  p er iod  is  
regarded more as an accentuation  in s t y le  rather than a change in  con­
ten t .  The increase o f  in d o c t r in a t io n ,  mass dem onstrations, m il i ta ry  
tra in in g ,  takeover and n a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  fo re ig n  p roperty , e t c . ,  are 
in terp re ted  mostly as an in t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  the id e o lo g i c a l  "smoke­
screen" to d is t r a c t  from the increasing  p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  con tra d ic
26. I think here especially of Jan M. Pluvierfs work Confrontations: A Study in 
Indonesian Politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965) which saw 
the whole system of Guided Democracy as a scheme of Sukarno, the conservative 
elite and the Army to suppress the PKI (see esp. pp. 52-85, passim). While 
Legge saw Sukarno as a conservative, Pluvier viewed him more as a reactionary. 
The point that Guided Democracy was tending to forestall the PKI's rise to 
power had, of course, already earlier been stressed in Donald Hindley's influ­
ential essay "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestica­
tion," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVI, No. 4 (December 1962), pp. 
915-926; see also his The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966). Both these authors, however, had con­
cluded their studies at a time when the radical trend may not have been so 
clearly apparent. The only other overall study of Guided Democracy, Herbert 
Feithfs "Dynamics of Guided Democracy" in Ruth McVey (ed.), Indonesia (New 
Haven: HRAF, 1963), pp. 309-4*09, was also written too early to perceive the 
significant changes in the second period. However, Feith's later article 
"President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," 
Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 8 (August 1964), pp. 969-980, already registered the 
new trend. Mortimer* s work, "The Ideology,*' a study of Guided Democracy from his 
particular research intention, had also indicated a radical trend.
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t ion s  o f  the system. My in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the years 1964-5 leads me 
to the conclusion  that the f in a l  per iod  o f  Guided Democracy c o n s t i ­
tutes a marked departure from the previous one. The case probably 
does not ju s t i f y  the c a l l  f o r  a c lea rcu t  ’ ’p e r i o d iz a t i o n , ” and any 
attempt to impose such a framework o f  periods on the o v e ra l l  analysis  
o f  Guided Democracy might hinder an understanding o f  the e sse n t ia l  
s im i la r i t i e s  e x is t in g  over time. However, we have to account fo r  the 
ra d ica l  trend in both domestic and fo re ig n  p o l i c y  which marked Guided 
Democracy a f t e r  the ’ ’watershed” o f  la te  summer 1963, which was dramati­
c a l ly  manifested in the change o f  p e r s o n a l i t ie s  from Djuanda to Suban- 
d r io  as Prime M in ister . I f  i t  is  too a r t i f i c i a l  to argue fo r  a c le a r  
break with the previous p er iod , the changes which marked the years 
1964-5 from the i n i t i a l  years o f  the system cannot go unexplained, and 
I th ere fore  propose to r e in te rp re t  them in l ig h t  o f  Sukarno’ s r a d i c a l i -  
za tion .
It  seems to me that eva luations o f  Sukarno’ s p o l i t i c a l  thought 
and personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  have been rather one -s ided . We have b e ­
come used to regarding his cons is  tency o f  p r in c ip le s  and stubbornness to 
s t i c k  with a once es ta b lish ed  course as h is outstanding personal char­
a c t e r i s t i c s .  2 7 But in re fe r r in g  to th is  con s is ten cy , we more o ften  
pointed  to the red thread o f  a n t i -c o lo n ia l is m  and a n ti- im p er ia l ism , 
rather than to his con s isten cy  as a r a d ic a l .  We took him s e r io u s ly  
only as an a n t i - im p e r ia l i s t . Although s o c ia l  rad ica lism  and a n t i ­
cap ita lism  were c le a r  in the ’ ’e a r ly ” Sukarno o f  1 9 27 -3 3 ,27 8 h is  p o l i t i ­
ca l behavior a f te r  1945 seemed to substantia te  our doubts about the 
profundity  o f  h is  rad ica lism . The two most con serv a t iv e , even ’ ’ r i g h t ­
i s t ” phases o f  his p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  in 1948 and in the summer o f  1963, 
have c le a r ly  impaired h is  ra d ica l  record  and ce r ta in ly  require  explana­
t io n .
While we a l l  assumed that Sukarno had abandoned any s o c ia l  r a d i ­
calism fo r  good, we have never s e r io u s ly  considered  that he may have 
merely postponed i t .  As I w i l l  argue la t e r ,  Sukarno had from the out- 
s e t - -a s  a t a c t i c a l  exped ien t--en v isaged  the postponement o f  the s o c ia l  
rev o lu t ion  to a time when the f i r s t  stage o f  the r e v o lu t io n ,  the na­
t io n a l  rev o lu t ion  against im perialism , was completed. His domestic 
rad ica lism  a f te r  1963, when the u n if ie d  s ta te  with the in c lu s io n  o f  
West Irian  had been es ta b lish ed  and a l l  domestic r e b e l l io n s  endanger­
ing nationa l in teg ra t ion  had f i n a l l y  been q u e lled , is  th ere fore  quite  
con s is ten t  with his view o f  the proper h i s t o r i c a l  sequence o f  the rev o ­
lu tion ary  stages , and provides a l in k  to h is  former phase o f  rad ica lism  
in the la te  1920’ s and early  1930’ s.
Another shortcoming o f  the orthodox view o f  Sukarno as a conserva ­
t iv e  is  the tendency to see a fundamental unity between the res t  o f  
the e l i t e  and him. This analysis  s tresses  that h is  c la ss  background 
and c la ss  p r iv i le g e s  made i t  inherently  u n lik e ly  that he was in te res ted  
in profound s o c ia l  changes29 undermining the p o s i t io n  o f  the e l i t e ,  o f
27. See Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 24, 28, and the late Harry J. Benda’ s foreword 
to Dahm, p. v ii .
28. For the integration of anti-imperialism and social radicalism in the ’’early” 
Sukarno, see his collection of essays Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, I (Djakarta: 
Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964).
29. See Legge, Sukarno, p. 353; also p. 8.
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which they see him a p art. Although h is to r y  has given ample examples 
o f  bourgeois  in t e l le c t u a ls  and rev o lu t ion ary  leaders negating th e ir  
c la ss  in te re s ts  in order to  take the s ide o f  the re v o lu t io n ,  orthodox 
observers do not seem to think that Sukarno could repeat th is  example.
i t  seems to me that we have p laced  Sukarno too much among the 
e l i t e  and too l i t t l e  among the masses. His decided s h i f t  to  the l e f t  
in the la te  period  o f  Guided Democracy represents a conscious s h i f t  
to a new s o c ia l  re feren ce  group. There was a c o n f l i c t  r i s in g  between 
him and the res t  o f  the e l i t e ,  who wanted to sabotage the l e f t i s t  
in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the re v o lu t io n .  Sukarno seemed intent on cu tt in g  
the um bilica l cord to  the " h y p o c r i t i c a l "  and "rea c t io n a ry "  leaders who 
used revo lu t ion ary  vocabulary merely fo r  se l f -e n r ich m e n t . He t r ie d  to 
l iv e  up to h is claim to be a s o c ia l  r e v o lu t io n is t  in a dd it ion  to 
being an a n t i - im p e r ia l i s t ,  and attempted to e s ta b l ish  h is  revo lu t ion ary  
p rog ress iv e  cre d e n t ia ls  and a d i s t in c t l y  new s o c ia l  i d e n t i t y , 30 which 
stressed  the "p eop le "  rather than the e l i t e  as h is c l i e n t e l e .  He no 
longer appeared in te re s te d  in an u n q u a lif ied  unity  and the se cu r ity  o f  
e l i t e  p r iv i l e g e s ,  but rather seemed intent on cu l l in g  "cou n terrev o lu ­
t io n a r ie s "  from the body p o l i t i c . 31
The tendency to doubt Sukarno as a revo lu t ion ary  stems from c e r ­
ta in  L ib e ra l -L e ft  Western standards which equate a ce r ta in  model o f  
personal l i f e - s t y l e  with the " t ru e "  image o f  a rev o lu t ion a ry . In th is  
context Sukarno’ s conspicuous consumption and h is  sexual prom iscuity  
made fo r  some in t e l l e c t u a l  bankruptcy and did not square w ell  with the 
c r i t e r i a  fo r  a s e l f l e s s ,  devoted and a s c e t ic  revo lu tion ary  lea d er ,  who 
should p o s s ib ly  wear C astro ’ s army fa t ig u e  and s leep  on Boumedienne’ s 
army c o t .  Sukarno’ s vanity  was c e r ta in ly  in the way o f  h is  ra d ica lism , 
even to the point o f  p h y s ica l ly  d iv ert in g  h is  energies and o f fe r in g  a 
source o f  d is t r a c t io n .  For Western observers some c r i t i c a l  c o n tr a d ic ­
t ion s  between h is  p r iva te  l i f e  and h is  p u b lic  r o le  e x is te d .  They im­
paired  h is  ra d ica l  re cord , but they cannot negate h is  ra d ica l  propen­
s i t i e s  .
Another ob s ta c le  to taking Sukarno s e r io u s ly  as a rev o lu t ion ary  
leader has gen era lly  been h is  v o lu n ta r is t  and id e a l i s t  approach to the 
problem o f  rev o lu t ion  and s o c ia l  change. He in s is te d  on f i r s t  i n s t i ­
tuting  a "mental r e v o lu t io n "  e lim inating  c o lo n ia l  i n f e r i o r i t y  complexes 
reb u ild in g  the Indonesian id e n t i t y ,  crea t in g  a p o l i t i c a l l y  and s o c i a l l y  
conscious rev o lu t ion ary  p e r s o n a l i ty ,  and engaging in "ch a ra cter  b u i ld ­
ing" and "nation  b u ild in g "  as w ell  as world-wide op p os it ion  to im peri­
alism as a prerequisite to economic development. These aims have been 
c a l le d  u t t e r ly  u n r e a l i s t i c  and im p ractica b le . Such charges have 
some truth in view o f  Sukarno’ s d i s in t e r e s t  in economic and adm inistra­
t iv e  m atters. But given h is  more ra d ica l  expectations  o f  the outcome 
o f  the re v o lu t io n ,  he was c e r ta in ly  c o r r e c t  to charge that the a lte rn a ­
t iv e  approach o f  f i r s t  concentrating  on the economy and le t t in g  s o c ia l  
r e la t io n s  be shaped by the economic base would lead to  compromises and 
disfigurem ents o f  the o r ig in a l  aims o f  the re v o lu t io n .
30. For a change of social identity, compare Raymond Williams, Orwell (London: 
Fontana, 1971), pp. 87-88.
31. For Sukarno’ s criticism of the elite, see his major speeches in 1964 and 1965, 
especially the Independence Day speeches and the address, as well as the written 
message, to the MPRS on April 11, 1965, Berdiri Diatas Kaki Sendiri (Berdikari) 
([Djakarta]: MPRS dan Departemen Penerangan R.I., Penerbitan Chusus No. 366, 
[1965]).
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Revolutionary Stages and Sukarno’ s tTRadical Delay"
I f  one looks fo r  the motives o f  Sukarno's conscious move to the 
l e f t  in the la te r  h a l f  o f  Guided Democracy, i t  may be convenient to 
begin by considering  his understanding o f  rev o lu t ion  and revo lu tion ary  
stages. Although Legge notes the frequent use o f  the term " re v o lu t io n "  
in Sukarno's la s t  years in o f f i c e , 32 he id e n t i f i e s  Sukarno's p reoccu ­
pation  with rev o lu t ion  as a s p ir i t u a l  and r h e to r ic a l  e x e r c is e ,  and 
doubts h is  in ten tion  and cap ac ity  fo r  ra d ica l  s o c ia l  a c t ion .
There is  indeed much evidence that the term " r e v o lu t io n , "  l ik e  
many o th ers , was used in such an exaggerated and in f la t io n a r y  manner 
during Guided Democracy that i t  may w ell have lo s t  i t s  meaning. It 
is  s tr ik in g  to see how the "Indonesian R ev o lu t ion ,"  which had been, in 
essence, a tru ly  h ero ic  independence s tru g g le ,  but hardly a s o c ia l  
rev o lu t ion  in the c la s s i c a l  sense, was declared  to ex ce l the French 
and Russian Revolutions and to be the most p rogress ive  rev o lu t ion  o f  
the twentieth century, having un iversa l s i g n i f i c a n c e .33 34
Despite the hubris and id e o lo g ic a l  zeal that these assertion s  mani­
fe s te d ,  a case can be made that unlike the rest  o f  the Guided Democracy 
e l i t e ,  Sukarno's commitment to and h i s t o r i c a l  understanding o f  r e v o lu ­
t ion  was con s is ten t  and r e f l e c t i v e .3h From the early  years o f  the 
independence struggle  he had conceived  o f  the Indonesian Revolution in 
two d i s t in c t  phases, a nationa l and a s o c ia l  p h a s e .35 The second 
phase could only be reached a f te r  the f i r s t  had been completed. The 
nature o f  c o lo n ia l  domination d ic ta ted  the p r i o r i t y  o f  the nationa l 
rev o lu t ion  against the fo re ig n  enemy, fo r  as long as s ta te  power was 
c o n tr o l le d  by a fo re ig n  c o lo n ia l  power, no s o c ia l  changes could be 
e f fe c t e d  anyhow. The strength  o f  the c o lo n ia l  enemy and the weakness 
o f  the Indonesians a lso  required  that the s o c ia l  phase o f  the re v o lu ­
t ion  be postponed, fo r  any s o c ia l  c o n f l i c t  during the national phase
32. Legge, Sukarno, pp. 349 f f .
33. For this line of argument, see Sukarno, Reflections on the Indonesian Revolution 
([Djakarta]: Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1964), esp. 
pp. 10-11; Subandrio, The Essence of National Independence and the Revolution 
of Mankind ([Djakarta]: Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 
[1963]), pp. 11-14. On the universal significance of the Indonesian Revolution, 
see also the ideological treatises of Ratu Aminah Hidajat, Peranan politik luar 
negeri Indonesia dan konfrontasi Nefo lawan Oldefo, menudju pembentukan dunia 
Baru ([Bandung?]: n.p., [1964?]), pp. 14-15, and Chaerul Saleh, The Proclamation 
of 17th of August 1945: The Eruption into Being of the New Emerging Forces (Ban­
dung: Galunggung, [1964?]), pp. 52-55.
34. A rather neglected source on Sukarno’ s view of revolution, the revolutionary 
stages, revolutionary leadership, and the subjective and objective factors in a 
revolutionary situation is his work of 1947, Sarinah (Djakarta: Panitya Penerbit 
Buku-Buku Karangan Presiden Sukarno, 1963), chapter VI, esp. pp. 254-288. See 
also his 1958 lectures on Pantja Sila, published in Pantja Sila: The Basis of 
the State of the Republic of Indonesia ([Djakarta]: National Committee for Com­
memoration of the Birth of Pantja Sila, [1964]), pp. 83-86.
35. Legge, Sukarno, p. 349, correctly remarked that Sukarno's view of the revolution­
ary stages may have been influenced by the rather similar Communist terms of a 
"national-democratic" and a "socialist" phase of the revolution in the colonial 
countries. For Sukarno's later elaboration of the revolutionary phases, see 
Sarinah, pp. 264-266.
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o f  the rev o lu t ion  would have undermined and weakened the unity o f  the 
co lo n ize d .
While Sukarno’ s emphasis in the r e v o lu t io n ’ s f i r s t  stage was a n t i-  
im p e r ia l is t ,  the second stage was a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t ,  or at le a s t  pointed  
towards some form o f  Indonesian so c ia l ism . I f  he did not d e ta i l  the 
exact s p e c i f i c a t io n s  o f  the s o c ia l  changes he had in mind, th is  may 
have been due to a lack o f  a c le a r  v is io n  o f  s o c ia l  change, as Legge 
a s s e r ts ,  but can a lso  be seen as a t a c t i c a l  requirement to keep t o ­
gether the p o l i t i c a l l y  and c u l tu r a l ly  heterogeneous members o f  his 
a n t i - im p e r ia l is t  united f r o n t ,  who would p o s s ib ly  clash  in the s o c ia l  
phase.
The notion  that the rev o lu t ion  con s is ted  o f  two stages was an im­
portant part o f  Sukarno’ s p o l i t i c a l  thought, and he c o n s is te n t ly  
argued that the re su lt  o f  the f i r s t  a n t i - im p e r ia l is t  stage o f  the rev o ­
lu t io n ,  Indonesian p o l i t i c a l  independence (merdeka) , should not be 
seen as the end o f  the re v o lu t io n ,  but as the bridge to the second 
stage , the s o c ia l  r e v o lu t io n .  The rev o lu t ion  was not yet f in is h e d ,  
fo r  the nationa l rev o lu t ion  had ju s t  allowed the re v o lu t io n a r ie s  to 
s e ize  s ta te  power, which now enabled them to e f f e c t  the s o c ia l  changes 
necessary to achieve the second o b je c t iv e  o f  the Indonesian R evolution , 
the ju s t  and prosperous s o c i e t y . 36
I f  Sukarno was as s e r io u s ly  committed to these ideas and concerned 
about the progress o f  the rev o lu t ion  as I have a sserted , i t  can l e g i t i ­
mately be asked, why d id n ’ t he move to implement h is  ideas in the 
1950’ s a f te r  the n a t io n a l is t s  were in co n tro l  o f  s ta te  power, and what 
prevented him from doing so a f t e r  he had gained ascendency in a p o l i t i ­
ca l system whose ra t io n a le  supposedly was to carry on the unfin ished  
rev o lu t ion ?
Sukarno’ s l im ited  p o l i t i c a l  leverage in Indonesian p o l i t i c s  from 
1945 to roughly 1955--which resu lted  from his  c o l la b o r a t io n is t  record  
and the se t t in g  up o f  a W estern-sty le  parliamentary system, where he 
was con fined  to the r o le  o f  an in f lu e n t ia l ,  but not a l l -p o w e r fu l  
figurehead P r e s id e n t - - is  not a con c lu s iv e  explanation  o f  h is  o ften  
conservative  and compromising record  during th is  time. More than the 
l im its  o f  h is  p o l i t i c a l  power res tra in ed  Sukarno from adopting a more 
ra d ica l  program.
A f i r s t  te n ta t iv e  explanation  fo r  the lack  o f  Sukarno’ s ’ ’ra d ica l  
re co rd ” in domestic p o l i c i e s  during the early  1950’ s may l i e  in the 
fa c t  that in h is  id e a l i s t  euphoria about the p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t s  o f  the 
independence s tru gg le  he had probably not understood how ra p id ly  the 
Indonesian e l i t e  would go conservative  and how qu ick ly  the s a c r i f i c e  
and devotion  o f  the independence stru g g le  would end up in enriohissez- 
vous. Only in the mid-1950’ s does he seem to wake up to the r e a l i t y  
that the e l i t e  around him had seen the t ra n s fe r  o f  sovere ign ty  as the 
end and the only o b je c t iv e  o f  the rev o lu t io n  and had no in ten t ion  o f  
entering  in to  an uncertain  second s o c ia l  stage o f  the rev o lu t ion  which 
might endanger th e ir  s o c ia l  p r iv i le g e s  and ra p id ly  involve  the masses 
in p o l i t i c s .
36. For the general theme of independence as a ’’bridge” to the future society, see 
Sukarno’ s ’’Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka" (1933), in Dibawah Bendera Revolusi,
I, pp. 285-289.
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But there are more important reasons fo r  th is  phenomenon o f  com­
promise and Mra d ica l  de lay” in Sukarno. The most profound was that 
u n t i l  the return o f  West Ir ia n , Sukarno was preoccupied  with the 
nationa l stage o f  the Indonesian rev o lu t ion  and not yet  with i t s  
s o c ia l  o b je c t iv e s .  In th is  nationa l stage the major p r i o r i t y  was the 
f ig h t  against imperialism to achieve the unitary s ta te  from Sabang to 
Merauke, and to safeguard nationa l in teg ra t ion  against se p a ra tis t  dan­
gers and in tern a l r e b e l l io n s .
From the beginning o f  the 1950?s continued Dutch con tro l  over 
West Irian  and over the Indonesian economy served to c a l l  a t ten tion  to 
the unfin ished  character o f  the national stage o f the re v o lu t io n ,  and 
he rather s i m p l i s t i c a l l y , but p o l i t i c a l l y  persuasively , a t tr ib u ted  a l l  
domestic i l l s  to the fa i lu r e  to so lve  these problems. They demanded 
p r io r i t y  in the national stru gg le  and generated a postponing o f  the 
s o c ia l  o b je c t iv e s  o f  the re v o lu t io n .  The seriousness o f  the threats 
to the very su rv iva l o f  Indonesia as a unitary  s ta te  u n t i l  1962 by 
reg ion a l r e b e l l i o n ,  and the mixture o f  warlordism, r e l ig io u s  fa n a t i ­
cism and sheer banditry  has been u n derestim ated .37 They preoccupied  
the concern o f  the decis ion -m akers, making a l l  domestic s o c ia l  p r o ­
grams im possib le .
One can argue that Sukarno’ s emphasis on the a n t i - im p e r ia l is t  
stru gg le  and his postponement o f  the s o c ia l  phase o f  the rev o lu t ion  
were not r e a l ly  caused by t h e o r e t ic a l  concerns about the proper s e ­
quence and t a c t i c a l  n e c e s s i t ie s  o f  the stages o f  the re v o lu t io n ,  but 
rather r e f le c t e d  a ce r ta in  personal p o l i t i c a l  hedonism. His a n t i ­
im p e r ia l is t  p o l i t i c a l  s k i l l s  were c e r ta in ly  s t r ik in g  when compared 
with his d is in t e r e s t  and lack  o f  knowledge in a dm in istra tive , o rg a n i­
za tion a l and economic m atters. I t  can a lso  be argued that the whole 
fo re ig n  p o l i c y  p r io r i t y  was nothing but a shrewd maneuver, a conven­
ient excuse to ward o f f  domestic s o c ia l  transform ations. (See be low .)  
But, a f te r  the return o f  West Irian  and the q u e ll in g  o f  the domestic 
r e b e l l i o n ,  the unitary s ta te  as the o b je c t iv e  o f  the national stage o f  
the rev o lu t ion  was achieved, and there was no longer any need [or any 
p r e t e x t ! ]  to postpone the s o c ia l  phase o f  the Indonesian R evolution . 
Nearly a l l  observers see the summer o f  1963 as a watershed in Indone­
sian domestic p o l i t i c s  when Sukarno f o r  a time was se r io u s ly  committed 
to a program o f  economic s t a b i l i z a t i o n .
The most puzzling aspect o f  th is  phase fo r  the argument o f  Sukarno 
as a ra d ica l  i s ,  o f  course , his support f o r  a " r i g h t i s t , "  Western- 
backed program o f  economic s t a b i l i z a t i o n . 38 One cannot explain  th is
37. For the scope of the domestic challenge to the central authority and its final 
demise in the early 1960fs, see Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, "The End of the 
Indonesian Rebellion," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 
32-46.
38. The economic stabilization program worked out by the International Monetary Fund 
and the United States in cooperation with the Indonesian government basically 
provided for a credit of $250 million (of which the American share would be 
roughly $100 million) to contain the Indonesian inflation and stop the economic 
decline. Some points on which the IMF insisted as a precondition for the cred­
its were the Indonesian commitments to a reduction of military expenditures, a 
devaluation of the rupiah, a tight credit policy, a balanced budget, and--most 
harsh--price decontrol on all commodities. For a discussion of the domestic and 
international aspects of the stabilization program, see Frederick P. Bunnell,
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period  o f  " in co n s is te n cy "  by assuming Sukarno was naive about the 
p o l i t i c a l  concessions these s t a b i l i z a t i o n  plans involved  to the I n t e r ­
n ationa l Monetary Fund and the USA, although he may have been ignorant 
about the d r a s t ic  economic e f f e c t s  these plans would have on the p o o r .39 40123
Sukarno’ s support o f  th is  program and h is  e a r l ie r  agreements with the 
Western o i l  companies'*0 c le a r ly  do not f i t  in to  a " r a d i c a l11 in te r p r e ­
ta t io n  and they cannot be ignored.
Sukarno’ s temporary turn to the r igh t has never been adequately 
explained. **1 However, by September 1963 he had la rg e ly  scrapped the 
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  program a f te r  domestic op p os it ion  to i t  had mounted 
from many quarters , and a f te r  he had re a l iz e d  the extent o f  the domes­
t i c  and fo re ig n  p o l i c y  concessions e n ta ile d .  Domestically, the s t a b i l ­
iz a t io n  plans would have committed the Indonesian government to accept 
ce r ta in  p o l i t i c a l  and economic demands o f  i t s  in tern a tion a l c r e d i t o r s ,  
which included American in s is ten ce  on the PKI’ s exc lu s ion  from the 
c a b in e t .1*2 Moreover, i t  became ever more apparent concerning the de­
velop ing  c r i s i s  about Malaysia, that the aid to Indonesia would a lso  
be made contingent on "reasonable"  behavior and re s t r a in t  towards the 
new s t a t e . 1*3 It  seems that by September Sukarno was ne ither  w i l l in g  
to accept these fo re ig n  p o l i c y  s tr in gs  nor to t o le r a te  a c a p i t a l i s t  
approach to so lv in g  Indon esia ’ s economic problems. But the fa c t  r e ­
mains that f o r  a ce r ta in  period  in 1963 he seems to have been w i l l in g  
to compromise his l e f t i s t  p r in c ip le s .
A second reason fo r  Sukarno’ s " ra d ic a l  delay" was h is  p e cu lia r  
way o f  de fin in g  the Indonesian revo lu t ion ary  o b je c t iv e s  in the context 
o f  an in tern a tion a l r e v o lu t io n .  He would take detours by supporting 
in tern a t ion a l o b je c t iv e s  to speed the progress o f  the domestic r e v o lu ­
nThe Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963” (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell Uni­
versity, 1969), pp. 308-441, and also Franklin Weinstein, ”The Uses of Foreign 
Policy in Indonesia” (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1972), pp. 422-423 and 
578-582.
39. The so-called ”May 26 regulations" of 1963, which were a part of the stabiliza­
tion program, called among other things for a 400-600% increase in certain pub­
lic  u tility  and service costs, which had been heavily government subsidized and 
kept on an artif ic ia lly  low level before; for details on the May 26 regulations, 
see J. A. C. Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian Inflation (Ithaca: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1967), pp. 39-40.
40. For an in-depth discussion of the June 1, 1963 agreement with the Western o il  
companies, where the ties between the U.S. government and the international cor­
porations become strikingly apparent, see Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives,” 
pp. 351-373.
41. For an attempt to explain Sukarno1s shift to the right as the interplay of sev­
eral variables, see ib id . , pp. 410-416.
42. See ibid. , p. 423. For a very frank admission that the exclusion of the PKI 
from the government was at adl times the major U.S. objective in Indonesia, see 
the memoirs of the former U.S. ambassador to Indonesia (1958-1965), Howard P. 
Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 
esp. pp. 236, 254-255, 260.
43. For a discussion of how the end of the aid program and Indonesian foreign 
policy against Malaysia were linked and interpreted in Indonesia, see Weinstein, 
"The Uses of Foreign Policy,” pp. 417-418 and 582.
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t io n .  His T rotzky ite  v iew 1"1* o f  the r e la t io n  between the nationa l and 
the in tern a tion a l rev o lu t ion  was never r e a l ly  taken s e r io u s ly  by 
his c r i t i c s .  Since they held  that such an approach to  the domestic 
rev o lu t ion  was im practica l (which i t  probably w a s ) , h is  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  
could  e a s i ly  be c a l le d  an ’ ’adventure. "  Thereby Indonesian fo re ig n  
p o l i c y  could be explained as the e g o - t r ip  o f  an a n t i - im p e r ia l is t  c ru ­
sader seeking redress f o r  former c o lo n ia l  s u f fe r in g s ,  or as an escap ­
i s t ,  ’ ’ scapegoat” approach o f  a conservative  e l i t e  anxiously  determined 
not to rock the boat at home.
The ’ ’e s c a p is t ” and ’ ’scapegoat” explanations o f  Indonesian fo re ig n  
p o l i c y  never r e a l ly  dea lt  with the fa c t  that Sukarno considered  the 
problem o f  the domestic rev o lu t ion  in i t s  in tern a t ion a l a sp ects , and 
that in his percep tion  there was a very c lo s e  connection  between an 
a n t i - im p e r ia l is t  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  and s o c ia l  rev o lu t ion  at home. Since 
in te rn a t io n a l ly  Indonesia was f ig h t in g  cap ita lism  as the root  cause o f  
im perialism , domestic p o l i t i c s  would have to be synchronized with 
fo re ig n  p o l i c y .
Of course , one can argue that Sukarno’ s in tern a t ion a l detour was 
merely a p re tex t  f o r  not doing anything about domestic s o c ia l  p rog ress ,  
and at the same time a lso  a shrewd r a t io n a l iz a t io n  fo r  eventual f a i l ­
ures , which could always be a ttr ib u ted  to the strength o f  in tern a t ion a l 
cap ita lism  and im perialism . But even i f  Sukarno’ s fo re ig n  p o l i c y ,  f o r  
the sake o f  argument, was ju s t  intended to d is t r a c t  from the conserva­
t iv e  status quo, these very fo re ig n  p o l i c y  act ions  had important re p e r ­
cussions on domestic p o l i t i c s ,  and threatened to undermine the status 
quo he was supposedly try ing  to preserve .
T herefore , i t  seems premature to argue, as P lu v ie r4 5 and Wein­
s t e i n 46 have done, that the a n t i - im p e r ia l is t  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  was b a s i ­
c a l ly  a d iv e rs io n ,  a ’ ’ sa fe ty  v a lv e ” devised  by the conservative  e l i t e  
o f  Guided Democracy, where the PKI could l e t  o f f  steam without endan­
gering the conservative  s o c ia l  status quo. Such a view seems to assume 
that fo re ig n  p o l i c y  is  an is o la te d  and separate area, where a n ti- im p er­
i a l i s t  a ctions would not have domestic p o l i t i c a l  consequences. This
44. Sukarno was well aware of the Stalin-Trotzky debate in the 1920’ s about the 
priorities of the international revolution versus ’’Socialism in one country.”
See Sukarno, Pantja Sila: The Basis of the State, pp. 137-139, and also Dibawah 
Bendera Revolusi, I, pp. 521-531. Although Sukarno’ s name was not mentioned, 
his "internationalist” foreign policy was also linked to Trotzky by Mohammad 
Sadli in his contribution to Kebangkitan Semangat ’ 66: Mendjeladjah Tracee Baru 
(Djakarta: n.p., Simposium, diselenggarakan oleh Universitas Indonesia, 6 Mei 
1966-9 Mei 1966 dengan Kerdjasama KAMI dan KASI), various pagings, stenciled.
45. Pluvier, Confrontations, p. 74, asserts that "Confrontation was not meant to 
annex any Malaysian territory; it  was intended only to prevent a social revolu­
tion in Indonesia by allowing the PKI to let o ff  steam in a direction where it 
could do no harm to the Indonesian ruling e l i te .” See also pp. 56-60 for Plu­
vier *s rationale for this interpretation.
46. Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy,” p. 50, writes: "Thus, the anti-Western
campaigns of Sukarno not only expressed deeply held feelings but also, among 
other things, constituted a way in which a basically conservative elite could 
provide the illusion of revolutionary progress, without undertaking the risks
to its own position that a real internal revolution would entail.”
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view o f  the fu n ction  o f  Indonesian fo re ig n  p o l i c y  during la te  Guided 
Democracy overlooks not only the s p i l l o v e r  e f f e c t s  and p o l i t i c a l  con­
sequences fo re ig n  p o l i c y  had on domestic p o l i t i c s ,  but a lso  the serious 
id e o lo g ic a l  and ruinous f in a n c ia l  commitment o f  Sukarno to these p o l i ­
c ie s  .
Konfrontasi was probably the most important s in g le  cause o f  the 
revived  dynamism and p o l i t i c a l  o f fe n s iv e  o f  the PKI in 1964-5. The 
anti-American and a n t i -B r i t is h  thrust o f  Indon esia 's  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  
led  to the domestic n a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  fo re ig n  ca p ita l  and property  and 
brought about in the spring o f  1965 the plans fo r  an autarchic  (berdi- 
kari) economy with domestic ca p ita l  accumulation which in the long run 
would have denied Indonesia to the in tern a t ion a l c a p i t a l i s t  economy 
and i t s  domestic a l l i e s .  The counteralignments towards C onfrontation 
and Indonesian d ip lom atic  c o l la b o r a t io n  with China under the "Peking- 
Djakarta a x i s , "  together  with the attempts o f  the superpowers, esp e­
c i a l l y  the U .S .,  to support anti-Communist, anti-Sukarno groups in 
Indonesian s o c i e t y ,  a lso  had the e f f e c t  o f  further  r a d ic a l iz in g  Sukarno 
and cementing his a l l ia n c e  with the L e ft .
A th ird  important reason fo r  the slow move o f  Sukarno towards 
more ra d ica l  action, which seems to have con tr ibu ted  to h is  c l a s s i f i c a ­
t ion  as a " c o n s e r v a t iv e ,"  was the fundamentally conservative  power 
con fig u ra t ion  around him. Sukarno's in flu en ce  was c le a r ly  l im ited  by 
other centers o f  power in the system. His p rogress ive  urge to "move 
h is to r y "  forward was not shared by the conservative  f o r c e s ,  which con­
tained him and emerged as ob s ta c le s  to any ra d ica l  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  
the rev o lu t ion . Despite his p op u lar ity  and unquestionable a u th or ity ,  
in a fundamental sense his power was l im ite d ,  and he could not r isk  a 
head-on strugg le  with those fo r c e s .  His awareness o f  the l im ita t io n s  
on his power very much in flu enced  h is  s tra tegy  o f  gradual p o l i t i c a l  
changes to the l e f t ,  which w i l l  be d iscussed  la t e r .
A fte r  th is  enumeration o f  the o b je c t iv e  r e a l i t i e s  and h is  pecu­
l i a r  su b je c t iv e  assessments which expla in  the " r a d ic a l  delay" o f  
Sukarno and his r e la t iv e ly  slow ra d ica l  c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n ,  i t  might be 
expedient to look at some more immediate personal concerns the P r e s i ­
dent may have f e l t  in the p o l i t i c a l  context o f  1964-5. Although other 
observers have s tressed  these points  b e fo r e ,  i t  seems worth repeating 
that under the impact o f  d e te r io ra t in g  h e a l t h ,1+7 the President may 
have f e l t  in those years that h is  time was running out, and that he 
had to assure a p rogress ive  course o f  the rev o lu t ion  and leave i t  in 
the hands o f  trustworthy su ccessors .
Sukarno was extremely aware o f  the judgment o f  h is to r y  and anxious 
to go in to  the h is to r y  books as a rev o lu t ion a ry , p rogress ive  founding 
fa th er  o f  the R epublic , rather than as the guardian o f  i t s  conserva­
t iv e  and corrupt status quo. He knew that in order to be considered  a 
progressive  in h i s t o r i c a l  judgment, his anti - im p e r ia l is t  record  was 
not enough, but had to be complemented by a domestic record  o f  s o c ia l  
p rogress . And he did not want merely to be thought o f  as a c o n s i s t ­
ent a n t i - im p e r ia l i s t , but rather as a revo lu t ion ary  leader. The other 
Afro-Asian p o l i t i c a l  leaders with whom he linked h im self  most o f t e n ,
Ho Chi Minh, Nasser, K eita , Nkrumah, Mao Tse-tung and Kim II Sung, and 47
47. Sukarno had some kidney treatment in Vienna in October 1964; he seems to have 
suffered from kidney-trouble again in December 1964. He then seems to have 
been i l l  in August-September 1965.
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o t h e r s ,48 had with exceptions and ce r ta in  con tra d ic t ion s  manifested 
these q u a l i t i e s .
Along with Sukarnof s conscious e f f o r t  to  change h is  s o c ia l  iden ­
t i t y  and c l i e n t e l e  in the la s t  two years o f  Guided Democracy49 there 
was an increasing  p r e d i le c t io n  to in te rp re t  the Indonesian Revolution 
as a p ro g re ss iv e ,  l e f t i s t  r e v o lu t io n ,  and a genuine " p e o p le d  re v o lu ­
t io n "  in order to d i f f e r e n t ia t e  i t  sharply from a "pa lace  re v o lu t io n "  
or a " l e a d e r s 1 r e v o l u t i o n . " 50 Although th is  had been the o r ig in a l  
ra t ion a le  o f  Guided Democracy,51 52 the res t  o f  the Indonesian e l i t e  had 
never paid more than l i p  se rv ic e  to i t .  Sukarno, however, was s e r io u s ­
ly  committed to l iv in g  up to  these id e o lo g i c a l  p re ten s ion s , and th re a t ­
ened to disengage h im self  from the reaction ary  and the h y p o c r i t i c a l  
members o f  the e l i t e  who were unw illing  to  adjust themselves to the 
rev iv a l  o f  the o r ig in a l  ra d ica l  p o te n t ia l  o f  the Indonesian R evolution . 
The fa te  o f  Ben B e lla ,  a leader who seemed to have had a l i f e  s ty le  
s im ila r  to h is  own, and to  whom he had e a r l i e r  re fe rre d  as a l ik e -  
minded rev o lu t ion a ry , seems to have hastened these tendencies in 
Sukarno. 5 2
Given the precarious p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  and the mutual d is t ru s t  o f  
the major contenders f o r  p o l i t i c a l  power in Indonesia , Sukarno must 
have become extremely anxious in h is la s t  years to set the rev o lu t ion  
on a more progress ive  course , to en force  a p o l i t i c a l  consensus about
48. For a l ist  of leaders with whom Sukarno ranked himself, see his address to the 
tenth anniversary of the first Asian-African conference, Djakarta, April 18,
1965, After Ten Years Still Onward, Never Retreat! ([Djakarta]: Executive Com­
mand Tenth Anniversary First Asian-African Conference, [1965]), p. 11.
49. See above p. 115.
50. See Sukarno’ s 1964 Independence Day speech, ’’Tahun vivere pericoloso,” espe­
cially the ’’revolutionary laws” he tried to set forward there. For the view of 
Manipol-USDEK as a ’’ le ftist  ideology” which has to side with ’’the majority of 
the people,” see his written message to the first anniversary of Mahadjaja-Uni- 
versity: Antara (the English edition is referred to here and in all later refer­
ences), Dec. 18, 1964, A.
51. For a compilation of the most important documents on the ideology of Guided 
Democracy, see Bahan-Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi (Djakarta: Prapantja, 1965), espe­
cially the sections on Manipol-USDEK and its specifications. See also Manipol- 
USDEK in Question and Answer ([Djakarta]: Department of Information, Republic 
of Indonesia, [1961]).
52. In his 1965 Independence Day speech Tjapailah Bintang-Bintang Dilangit! ([Dja­
karta]: Departemen Penerangan R.I., Penerbitan Chusus No. 382, [1965]), p. 34, 
Sukarno said: ’ ’There are leaders who are afraid they will meet Ben Bella’ s
fate. They only prove that they are leaders who represent vested interests.
Ben Bella’ s overthrow must serve as a warning to leaders everywhere that as 
soon as a leader separates himself from the people’ s interests he will be over­
thrown.” See also p. 21: ’’The fault of the imperialists and the reactionaries
is that they belittle the common people. Sbme Indonesian leaders, too, feel 
that they are at the right place only i f  they are among the wives of high rank­
ing o ffic ia ls , among people of noble ancestry, among bureaucratic capitalist 
directors, or among landlords or moneylenders. Yes, there are revolutionary 
leaders and reactionary leaders; there are true leaders and pseudo-leaders. ”
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i t ,  and to p ick  a r e l ia b le  su ccessor .  There is  indeed a s t r ik in g  simi 
l a r i t y  to Mao T se-tung! s concern fo r  the preservation  o f  the course o f  
the re v o lu t io n ,  the fea r  o f  i t s  capture by coun terrevo lu tionary  fo r ce s  
and the attempt to t ra in  the c o r r e c t  revo lu tion ary  su ccessors .
Sukarno! s preoccupation  with the f ig u re  o f  Sun Yat-sen may o f f e r  
some in s ig h ts  in to  how he saw his  own ro le  in r e la t io n  to  h is  su cce s ­
s o r . 53 It  has already been sa id  that Sukarno aspired  to b e - - l i k e  Sun 
Y a t-sen --a  p rog ress iv e  founding fa th er  o f  the R epublic , and whether i t  
was in i t ia t e d  by h im self  or by o th ers ,  such a comparison o f  the two 
f ig u res  was made54 during Guided Democracy. I t  is  tempting to see 
Indonesian su ccess ion  in terms o f  the Chinese h i s t o r i c a l  precedent; 
and moreover there was a remark by the President that he had strong 
o b je c t io n s  to being fo llow ed  by a Chiang Kai-shek, but wasn’ t h os ­
t i l e  to the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a more l e f t i s t  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e .55
The A ll ia n ce  with the L e ft :  A Rationale
I have summarized Sukarno’ s sp e c ia l  personal reasons f o r  gradual 
a c ce le r a t io n  o f  the domestic r e v o lu t io n ,  and have attempted to  expla in  
which id e o lo g ic a l  perception s  and domestic and in tern a t ion a l power 
r e a l i t i e s  account f o r  h is r e la t iv e ly  la te  re v iv a l  o f  ra d ica lism . It
53. In his important speech of 1945, Lahirnja Pantjasila, Sukarno referred repeated 
ly to Sun Yat-sen’ s ’’Three People's Principles” (San Min Chu I) as an important 
work that led him back from internationalism to nationalism; see The Birth of 
Pantjasila ([Djakarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 
[1967]), pp. 13, 20. For this see also Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 338-339.
Sukarno’ s characterization of Chiang Kai-shek as a reactionary (see the 
1965 Independence Day speech, Tjapailah, p. 22) stood in marked contrast to his 
reference to Sun Yat-sen as the ’’father of the Chinese nation” (Sukarno’ s ad­
dress to the American community in Djakarta, Dec. 21, 1964, in Antara, Dec. 25, 
1964, A-B.
54. In a speech before foreign diplomats in Djakarta in 1963, Information Minister 
Ruslan Abdulgani referred to the parallel between China after 1911 and the 
present Indonesia, and the parallels between Sun Yat-sen and Sukarno. Abdul­
gani told his audience that it  would be certain Indonesia would never allow the 
rise of a Chiang Kai-shek. See the collection of the minister's speeches, 
Pantjaran Api nan tak kundjung Padam ( [Dj akarta]: Departemen Penerangan R.I., 
Penerbitan Chusus No. 292, [1963]), pp. 140-141. I am indebted to Bernhard 
Dahm for calling this to my attention.
55. According to an interview of Herbert Feith with Ruslan Abdulgani on March 17, 
1967 (made available to the author by Ben Anderson), Sukarno called Abdulgani 
immediately after his speech (see note 54) and asked him jokingly what kind of 
leader he wanted after he (Sukarno) had left the scene. Abdulgani reportedly 
replied that he would like a successor embodying the same national, religious 
and social ingredients which characterized the President. To this Sukarno is 
said to have replied that since Abdulgani had ruled out the Chiang Kai-shek 
alternative, would he want a Mao Tse-tung? Abdulgani seems to have answered 
that this was going too far (’’Djangan sampai begitu dong!"), but Sukarno told 
him to be consistent in terms of his earlier alternative (’’kalau begitu kamu 
kurang konsekwen. Mengapa tidak mau berani terus?” ) . He seemed to have no ob­
jection i f  the PKI won the post-Sukarno competition for national leadership.
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is  now expedient to analyze the nature o f  h is re la t io n sh ip  to the L e ft ,  
p a r t i c u la r ly  the PKI, in the la te  period  o f  Guided Democracy.
In contrast to Legge, I do not see Sukarno as a "b a lan cer"  any 
longer , but b e l ie v e  that he had taken s id e s .  Although one cannot be 
sure that he intended to make the PKI h is  h e i r ,  he c e r ta in ly  t r ie d  to 
set in motion a p o l i t i c a l  re o r ie n ta t io n  o f  the country; the su cce s ­
sor would emerge from within the l e f t i s t - p r o g r e s s iv e  Nasakom c o n s t e l l a ­
t io n ,  where the PKI was the best organized and most powerful f o r c e .
The Sukarno-Army a l l ia n c e ,  which Legge thinks checked the PKI to 
the very end, a c tu a lly  was gradually  d is in t e g r a t in g - - r id d led  by s e r i ­
ous mutual susp ic ions  in 1964-5. Fear o f  an Army coup had driven 
Sukarno long ago to f o s t e r  in t e r - s e r v i c e  r i v a l r i e s  and to undermine 
the in s t i t u t io n a l  l o y a l t i e s  o f  o f f i c e r s  by e s ta b lish in g  personal l o y a l ­
t i e s  to h im .56 By 1965 the combined p r o s e ly t iz in g  o f  Sukarno and the 
PKI--whether i t  was coord inated  or not--had  assured the lo y a lty  o f  Air 
Force Commander Omar Dhani to the Sukarnoist s id e ,  and the p o l i t i c a l  
independence o f  Navy Commander Martadinata was s e r io u s ly  shaken a f te r  
an in tern a l o f f i c e r s ’ r e b e l l i o n . 57 Only the Army High Command c lo sed  
i t s  ranks against Sukarno.
The Army was h o s t i l e  to both domestic p o l i t i c a l  r e o r ie n ta t io n  and 
Sukarno’ s China p o l i c y ,  and during the events o f  1964 and 1965 i t  b e ­
came the orga n iza tion a l and in s p ir a t io n a l  center o f  the anti-Communist 
and anti-Sukarno f o r c e s . 58 It  is  d i f f i c u l t  to argue that the Sukarno- 
Army a l l ia n ce  against the PKI at that time was s t i l l  s tron g , because 
i t  is  obvious that the Army ce r ta in ly  did not cons ider  Sukarno as 
i t s  a l l y ,  but rather as the c h ie f  promoter o f  the PKI. Sukarno was 
aware o f  the trend o f  army p o l i t i c s ,  and, moreover, he was too su s p i ­
cious o f  i t s  fo re ig n  connect io n s 59 and the l ik e l ih o o d  o f  a coup with
56. On the general problem of Army-Sukarno relations, see Daniel S. Lev, ’’The Polit i­
cal Role of the Army in Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (Winter 
1963-4), pp. 349-364, and Michael Ehrmann, ”The Indonesian Military in the Poli­
tics of Guided Democracy: 1957-1965" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1967).
57. Little is known about the "Progressive Revolutionary Officers1 Movement" (Gera- 
kan Perwira Progressif Revolusioner) or about 5^0 naval officers who paralyzed 
the Naval Academy in Surabaja by a strike in mid-February 1965. The strike 
motives of the rebellious officers were concern about promotions as well as dis­
satisfaction with corruption in higher ranks. They also demanded Martadinata’ s 
resignation. Sukarnofs authority seems to have saved Martadinata, but in return 
he apparently had to soften his earlier ,anti-Nasakom stand.
58. Although the Armyfs role in the Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme (BPS) was concealed 
from public view, it  seems to have provided major financial and logistic sup­
port. On the BPS, see below, p. 129, n. 76.
59. Howard P. Jones’ memoirs, Indonesia: The Possible Dream, are quite revealing in 
their frank admission that the United States (like the Soviet Union) gave prior­
ity in its relations to the Indonesian Army as the guarantee of a future non- 
Communist Indonesia; see esp. pp. 127, 147,/ 203, 312, 345-347. According to 
Ruth McVey, more than four thousand Indonesian officers received military train­
ing in the United States before 1965; see her "The Post-Revolutionary Transfor­
mation of the Indonesian Army," Part II, Indonesia, No. 13 (April 1972), p. 169. 
See this article also generally for the political influence and the military 
significance of United States-Indonesian Army relations.
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fo re ig n  b a ck in g ,60 to tru st  i t  as an a l ly .
Legge, re fu t in g  the evidence o f  a pro-PKI p o l i c y  o f  Sukarno in 
1965, asserts  that Sukarno sided  with the Army on the issues o f  Nasa- 
komization o f  the armed fo r c e s .  His repeated re fu sa l  to e s ta b l ish  a 
rea l Nasakom cabinet with PKI shares in the ca b in e t ,  is  taken as e v i ­
dence o f  an unchanged balance o f  power. However, these moves do not 
n e ce s sa r i ly  r e f l e c t  Sukarno1s benevolence towards the Army, but rather 
s ig n i fy  the l im its  o f  h is  power in face  o f  army re s is ta n ce .  Sukarnofs 
a l l ia n c e  with the L e ft ,  e s p e c ia l ly  with the PKI, was the predominant 
aspect o f  1964-5 domestic p o l i t i c s .  This a l l ia n c e ,  although not a l ­
ways coord inated , and containing  sources o f  p o te n t ia l  c o n f l i c t ,  set  
in to  motion the p o l i t i c a l  o r ie n ta t io n  to the L e ft .
Before looking fo r  the evidence o f  th is  a l l ia n ce  in the domestic 
events o f  that time, an attempt w i l l  be made to construct  a ra t ion a le  
fo r  Sukarno! s a l l ia n ce  with the PKI. I w i l l  c a l l  my view o f  Sukarno 
in those years the ’ ’Castro s o lu t io n ” to the problem o f  the Indonesian 
R evolution , although a Castro-Sukarno comparison can only be advanced 
with certa in  reservation s  concerning C astro ’ s con tro l  over a r e v o lu ­
tionary  army and the weakness o f  a compromised Cuban Communist Party.
I f ,  a f te r  the return o f  West Ir ian  and the end o f  the domestic 
r e b e l l i o n s ,  Sukarno was s e r io u s ly  concerned with the problem o f  s o c ia l  
transform ation , he had to deal with orga n iza t ion a l problems to bring 
i t  about and to ensure i t s  co r r e c t  p o l i t i c a l  d ir e c t io n .  For both these 
reasons, the Indonesian L e ft ,  and e s p e c ia l ly  the PKI, gained h is  p e r ­
sonal favor .
Failure to so lve  problems o f  organ iza tion  and s o c ia l  m ob il iza t ion  
can be regarded as the cen tra l feature  o f  Indonesian p o l i t i c s  s ince  
independence. The Indonesian Revolution had succeeded in provid ing  
i t s  fo l low ers  with a new p o l i t i c a l  id e n t i t y ,  but unlike the genuine 
s o c ia l  revo lu t ion s  in neighboring coun tr ies  (Vietnam, China), i t  had 
not served as a t o o l  f o r  revo lu t ion ary  s o c ia l  m o b i l iz a t io n ,  but indeed 
had o ften  been used to prevent i t ,  because o f  the s o c i o - r e l i g i o u s  con­
f l i c t  such an attempt would have provoked. S oc ia l  m ob il iza t ion  and
60. In 1964-5 Sukarno was constantly accusing Nekolim of ’’plotting” and ’’subversion.” 
He considered the BPS as directed by the CIA (see his speech to the Congress of 
the Indonesian Journalists’ Union [PWI], on Feb. 23, 1965) and asked the military 
to be aware of subversion (written message to the 19th anniversary of the S il i-  
wangi Corps, in Antara, May 22, 1965, A). The whole ’’Gilchrist Document” affair 
seems to have reinforced Sukarno’ s fear of a linkage between the Army and imper­
ialist powers to overthrow him. This document, purporting to be a letter by 
the British ambassador Gilchrist to London, in which he referred to ”our local 
army friends,” was used by Subandrio in Indonesian diplomacy for the second 
Afro-Asian Conference to substantiate claims of imperialist subversive inten­
tions against Indonesia. The post-coup military trials of the Army have taken 
pains to reveal the document as a Communist plot, intended to discredit its re­
lations with Sukarno. According to the Army, the Gilchrist document was a Com­
munist forgery on stationery of the British embassy probably stolen during the 
ransacking of the embassy in 1963. For the Gilchrist document see Ali Said S.H. 
and Durmawel Ahmad S.H., Sangkur Adil, Pengupas Fitnah Chianat (Proses Dr. 
Subandrio didepan Mahmillub) (Djakarta: Ethika, [1967]), pp. 49-53, and G-3Q-S 
dihadapan Mahmillub di Djakarta, 3 (d jilid  I), Perkara Dr. Subandrio (Djakarta: 
P.T. Pembimbing Masa, [1967]), pp. 73-82.
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d is c ip l in e  are p re re q u is ite s  fo r  s o c ia l  transform ations, and Sukarno, 
l ik e  Castro in 1960, might have looked fo r  an org a n iza t ion a l t o o l  to 
e f f e c t  these changes. Since the o ld  PNI had not become the Marhaenist 
cadre party Sukarno had envisaged e a r l i e r  in the independence s tru g g le ,  
now the PKI, an in crea s in g ly  ra d ica l  PNI, and a l l  those who showed 
revo lu tion ary  zeal and w il l in g n ess  to in te rp re t  the Indonesian Revolu­
t ion  as a l e f t i s t  rev o lu t ion  based on a Mp ro g re ss iv e -re v o lu t io n a ry  
nationa l unity with Nasakom as i t s  a x i s , 1,61 could  transmit h is  ra d ica l  
in t e n t io n s .
Unlike Legge, who thinks Nasakom was a mere t a c t i c  and that 
Sukarno was not s e r io u s ly  commited to i t , 61 2 I think i t  was predominant 
to the very end. I agree with Dahm63 that Sukarno in some ways was 
naive to b e l ie v e  that he could ever unite such d ia m etr ica l ly  opposed 
fo rces  as Marxism and Islam. But h is  b e l i e f  in i t s  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  and 
his determination and s e l f - assuredness to en force  such a Nasakom-con- 
sensus b e fore  he l e f t  the scene must in flu en ce  our analysis  o f  h is  
a c t io n s .
I f  such a Nasakom unity  and consensus ever had become a p o l i t i c a l  
r e a l i t y ,  the PKI would probably have dominated th is  nation a l united 
fron t  because o f  i t s  superior  organ iza tion  and sheer numbers o f  f o l l o w ­
ers . This l ik e l ih o o d  led  many to charge that Nasakom was ju s t  a Trojan 
horse f o r  a PKI ride  to power, and that Sukarno was e ith er  naive on 
Communism or was becoming a fe l lo w  t r a v e l e r .64 I think one can s a fe ly  
deny these charges: in Sukarno's view o f  the Nasakom make-up, n a t ion ­
alism was c e r ta in ly  the strongest  element. Sukarno, unlike o th ers ,  
did not fear  the PKI or i t s  r o le  in a Nasakom un ity . Others would ask 
how he dared ride  the t i g e r ,  and warned him o f  a Czechoslovakian-type 
Communist takeover from w i t h in ,65 but Sukarno seemed w ell assured that 
he could handle the party and keep i t  in p la ce .  His success in the 
s e t t l in g  o f  the Madiun A f fa ir  supported his con fid en ce , and to the 
very end the PKI was probably more dependent on him than he was on the 
PKI.
It  is  again in te re s t in g  to compare Sukarno's r e la t io n sh ip  to the 
PKI with C astro 's  case. I f  one considers  the impact the towering Cuban 
leader had on the Communist Party o f  h is  c o u n tr y ,66 and how his  p erson­
a l i t y  created  havoc with i t s  d o c tr in a l  pu rity  o f  Marxism-Leninism, i t
61. The slogan Persatuan progressip-revolusioner berporos Nasakom was the main slo­
gan of 1965.
62. Legge, Sukarno, pp. 348-349.
63. Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 64-65, 336-350, explaineu this tendency primarily by Sukar­
no's strategic eclecticism and his Javanese inclination to look for synthesis 
and harmony of opposing forces. For Sukarno’ s stress on unity and synthesis, 
see also Legge, Sukarno, pp. 9, 71, 340, 356.
64. For an indication that by 1964 this may have been the prevailing view of Sukarno 
in the U.S. State Department, see Jones, Indonesia, p. 358, see also p. 357.7
65. Ibid. , p. 236, and pp. 254-255.
66. On the relation between Castro and the Cuban Communist Party, see Andres Suarez, 
Cuba, Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), 
and also the special issue on Cuba of Kursbuch (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), No. 18 
(1969), esp. the essay by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, "Bildnis einer Partei-Vorge- 
schichte, Struktur und Ideologie der PCC," at pp. 192-215.
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is  not a ltoge th er  unthinkable that Sukarno1s unquestionable authority  
and p opu lar ity  in Indonesia might have achieved the same re su lt  with 
h is  strong ego and independent-mindedness. I t  is  hard to imagine him 
as anybody1s s toog e , and the long record  o f  PKI compromise with the 
system o f  Guided Democracy and with his leadership  is  evidence o f  h is  
ca p a b i l i ty  to co n tro l  the party .
However, d esp ite  Sukarnofs expectations to con tro l  the PKI within 
the envisaged Nasakom u n ity , the PKI had a d i f f e r e n t  percep tion  o f  i t s  
ro le  in the a l l ia n c e .  Sukarno may have thought that he was in i t ia t in g  
and c o n t r o l l in g  the r e la t io n s h ip ,  but there is  evidence that th e ir  
a l l ia n ce  in 1964-5 was ch a ra cter ized  by mutual in f lu e n ce s ,  where the 
PKI sometimes in i t ia t e d  moves and presented Sukarno with a fait accom­
pli, fo r c in g  the government to a c t . 67 The a n t i - im p e r ia l is t  fe rv o r  o f  
p u b lic  p o l i t i c s  in the wake o f  the C onfrontation  p o l i c y  had o f fe r e d  
the PKI the chance to recapture the p o l i t i c a l  in i t i a t i v e  and gain new 
momentum.
An in te re s t in g  example o f  d isa ccord  in the Sukarno-PKI a l l ia n c e  
was th e ir  disagreement in 1964-5 about the proper d e f in i t i o n  o f  Indone­
s i a ^  revo lu tion ary  stages. As we have a sserted , there was an in c re a s ­
ing eagerness and ambition on Sukarno1s side to a cce le ra te  the Indone­
sian R evolution . For example, he remarked severa l times in 1965 that 
Indonesia was already entering the f,s o c i a l i s t "  stage o f  i t s  re v o lu t io n .  
Although Sukarno had e a r l i e r  e laborated  on the two d i f f e r e n t  stages o f  
the Indonesian R e v o lu t io n ,68 and had declared  that the second stage 
could only be entered a f te r  the f i r s t  had been completed, in  h is  Berdi- 
kari-speech  he suddenly explained that Indonesia was now entering  i t s  
s o c i a l i s t  p h a se .69 This zeal was immediately e x p lo ite d  by conserva­
t iv e  elements who used i t  f o r  th e ir  own purposes by po in tin g  out that 
s ince  Indonesia was already in i t s  s o c i a l i s t  phase, further  changes 
and reforms were not n e c e s s a r y .70
67. The anti-American demonstrations of 1964-5, especially the actions against the 
Peace Corps, the USIS libraries, American films and finally the seizure of for­
eign property, although they may have had the tacit support of Sukarno, gener­
ally developed a momentum where the government had to interfere in order keep 
things politically  in control. After the actions against foreign property in 
March and April 1965, all foreign enterprises in Indonesia were finally placed 
under government control by Presidential Decree No. 6/1965.
68. See the Independence Day speech of 1964, nTahun vivere pericoloso," and two 
speeches to the Marhaenist cadre course in Djakarta, March 24-25, 1965, in Ever 
upward, never go down! ( [Djakarta]: Departemen Penerangan R.I., Penerbitan 
Chusus No. 365, [1965]).
69. Sukarno, Berdiri Diatas Kaki Sendiri, p. 9.
70. See the editorial in Harian Rakjat, May 6, 1965, and Anwar SanusiTs reference 
to ’’signs of misunderstanding” and "abuse” of Sukarno’ s words in Harian Rakjat, 
July 20, 21, 1965. The opposition seems to have focused on Sukarno’ s remarks 
in the early phase of the independence struggle that Indonesia could attempt a 
phasensprung in its revolutionary development, i . e . ,  that it  could skip the 
capitalist phase of development and proceed right into socialism. Although 
Sukarno had later retreated from that statement, his voluntarism let him assert 
it  again in 1964. See his speech of July 6, 1964, Membangun Sosialisme Indone­
sia dengan konsepsi sendiri1 ([Djakarta]: Departemen Penerangan, R .I., Penerbi­
tan Chusus, No. 327, [1964]). These lapses of the President gave the opposition
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The PKI became very concerned about these developments. The p ar ­
ty emphasized that the f i r s t  stage o f  the rev o lu t ion  was not complete 
without a thorough implementation o f  i t s  a n t i - fe u d a l  and a n t i - im p e r i ­
a l i s t  o b je c t iv e s ,  i . e . ,  the implementation o f  the land-reform  program 
and the e lim ination  o f  fo re ig n  c a p ita l  on Indonesian s o i l . 71 Although 
the party was as eager to f in is h  the n a tion a l-d em ocra tic  stage and to 
proceed towards the s o c i a l i s t  stage , i t  o b je c ted  to having the then 
dismal s ta te  o f  Indonesian economic and s o c ia l  a f fa i r s  m islead ingly  
described  as ’ ’s o c ia l i s m ,” fo r  i t  c o r r e c t ly  feared  a demoralizing e f ­
f e c t  on i t s  cadres in that c a s e . 72 Talk o f  the ’ ’s o c i a l i s t ” phase o f  
the rev o lu t ion  a lso  immediately touched on the id e o lo g ic a l  requirement 
o f  p ro le ta r ia n  lea d ersh ip , something the PKI had to avoid d iscu ss in g . 
These PKI censurings o f  Sukarno about h is  t h e o r e t ic a l  blunders appar­
ently  led  him to re trea t  from his  e a r l i e r  euphoria, and in the Inde­
pendence Day speech o f  1965 he proclaimed that Indonesia was s t i l l  in 
the national democratic sta ge , and would implement the necessary s o ­
c ia l  changes to complete i t . 73
The Domestic Power C onfiguration  
and the Sukarno-PKI Strategy
As the ra t ion a le  fo r  Sukarno’ s a l l ia n ce  with the l e f t  has been 
explained, an analysis  o f  Sukarno’ s and the PKI’ s assessment o f  the 
domestic balance o f  power and the p o l i t i c a l  stra tegy  they chose in 
order to e f f e c t  the desired  changes to the Left w i l l  be attempted.
The confused, h e c t i c ,  and, in r e t r o s p e c t ,  a lso  ap oca lyp tic  domes­
t i c  atmosphere in Indonesia at that time impairs an attempt to come to 
an o b je c t iv e  assessment o f  the power r e a l i t i e s .  Generally accepted 
in d ica to rs  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power seem to be m issing. Arguments fo r  an
ample opportunity to stress the possibility of a phasensprung, and the PKI 
singled out Sajuti Melik as the one spreading this concept (see Harian Rakjat, 
November 25, 1964).
71. See Aidit’ s address to the working conference of the Bank Indonesia of June 7, 
1965, "Revolusi Indonesia dan Masalah Berdikari,” Harian Rakjat, June 9, 1965. 
For PKI criticisms of Sukarno on the issue of entering the "socialist stage,” 
see also Harian Rakjat, April 29 and May 21, 1965.
72. Compare Mortimer, "The Ideology of the Communist Party," ch. I l l ,  p. 45.
73. In his 1965 Independence Day speech Sukarno scolded those countries which called
themselves socialist, although they s t i l l  had imperialist capital in the country 
and had not even started on national-democratic reforms. He said: "Indonesia
does not want to be hypocritical about its socialism. Indonesia clearly states 
that its revolution is s t i l l  at the national-democratic stage, although a number 
of important resuits havr been achieved at this stage. The time will arrive 
when Indonesia will build socialism, namely after imperialist capital has been 
liquidated completely and after the land owned by landlords is redistributed 
among the people" (see Tjapailah Bintang, pp. 34-35). These firm conditions did 
not hinder Sukarno from later repeating his earlier ambitious assertion that 
Indonesia was already entering the socialist stage. He repeated this on Sept. 
11, 1965 at the installation ceremony of the National Education Council (Antara, 
Sept. 13, 1965, A) and 1 efore graduates of the Bogor Institute of Agriculture at 
a ceremony at the Fogor Palace (see Indonesian Herald, Sept. 28, 1965).
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increased weight o f  the PKI in p u b lic  p o l i t i c s  are gen era lly  countered 
with re feren ces  to the lack o f  a Nasakom ca b in et ,  and the preservation  
o f  the monopoly o f  weapons, the ultim ate a rb ite r  o f  c o n f l i c t ,  with the 
Army. The o v e ra l l  impression Legge g iv e s ,  is  that the balance o f  
fo r ce s  had not r e a l ly  changed, and that Sukarno’ s moves in favor o f  
the PKI were a ’ ’r ed ress in g ” o f  the balance o f  power against the antag­
o n is t ,  who was in so le  possess ion  o f  the means o f  coe rc io n .
In 1964, Sukarno sided  with the PKI on a l l  the major domestic 
issu es . He had outlawed Manikebu,74 decided against the anti-PKI p ro ­
posal fo r  the merger o f  a l l  p a r t ie s  in to  o n e ,75 supported the a c c e l ­
erated enforcement o f  the land-reform  programs, outlawed the BPS76 and 
the Murba p a r t y ,77 and had the j o u r n a l i s t s ’ union purged and BPS news­
papers suspended.78 The cumulative e f f e c t  o f  these moves by January
74. Sukarno banned Manikebu (Manifesto Kebudajaan) in May 1964. It had been formu­
lated by a group of anti- Communist, pro-Western intellectuals late in 1963 and 
had advocated universal humanism in cultural works. The PKI had branded its 
universalism as "national nihilism" and had attacked its 1’ art pour 1 * art under­
tones. For Manikebu, see Keith R. Foulcher, "A Survey of Events Surrounding 
’ Manikebu1, The Struggle for Cultural and Intellectual Freedom in Indonesian 
Literature," Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde, 125, 4 (1969), pp. 
429-465.
75. Under the disguise of trying to promote the simplification of the party system, 
the anti-Communist forces in 1964 proposed the dissolution of all political par­
ties and their combination into one. Sukarno rejected this in his 1964 Inde­
pendence Day speech. For a compilation of the political polemics raging over 
the domestic issues of 1964, see the two volumes Polemik H.R. dan Merdeka (Dja­
karta: Merdeka Press, [1965]) and the PKI publication on the same topic, Polemik 
Merdeka--Harian Rakjat ([Djakarta]: Harian Rakjat, [1965]).
76. The Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme (BPS) was a loosely structured platform of anti­
communist newspapers, backed by non-Communist intellectuals and technocrats, 
the Murba party, Islamic and Christian groups, which had the backing of the 
Army leadership. Its intention was to separate the ideology of Guided Democracy 
from Communist influences and to separate Sukarno from the PKI. The movement 
was thus anti-Communist and also opposed the foreign policy trend, especially 
the China policy, but it  was not--originally--an anti-Sukarno movement. In its 
major ideological pronouncements, Juti’ s (Sajuti Melik) articles, "How to Study 
Sukarnoism," which were printed since June 1964 in the Murba paper Berita Indo­
nesia, major emphasis was placed on drawing a clear line between Sukarno’ s
and all forms of Communist thought. The movement probably started on the as­
sumption that Sukarno could s t i l l  be "rescued" from what was perceived as a 
"Communist embrace," and so it attempted to promote Sukarnoism as the sole state 
ideology at the expense of Communist teachings.
The BPS was o ff ic ia lly  founded in September 1964 under the leadership of the 
late Sumantoro, the editor of Berita Indonesia, of B. M. Diah from Merdeka, and 
Adam Malik, Murba-member and then Minister of Trade. It functioned mainly as a 
distribution agency for newsprint, and by December 1964 Sajuti Melik*s articles 
were reprinted by about 50 Indonesian newspapers (Antara, Dec. 17, 1964, A). 
Sukarno banned the movement on Dec. 17, 1964. For the BPS ideology, see Juti 
(Sajuti Melik), Beladjar Memahami Sukarno-isme, I (Djakarta: n .p . , 1964). For 
the Communist reaction, see "BPS" aksi reaksi (Djakarta: Rakjat, [1965]).
77. The Murba party was temporarily "frozen" on January 6, 1965 and banned for good 
in September 1965.
78. On February 23, 1965, during a speech commemorating the 19th anniversary of the 
Indonesian Journalists* Union, Sukarno ordered a temporary ban of all newspapers
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1965 t i l t e d  the balance o f  fo rces  cons iderab ly  in favor o f  the PKI.
With the major p latform  o f  the anti - Communist, anti-Sukarno (and a n ti-  
China) fo r ce s  banned, op p os it ion  papers tem porarily  suspended, the 
major news agency slow ly being f,r e t o o le d M in favor o f  the l e f t i s t s , 79 
the Army o f fe r e d  the la s t  guarantee o f  organized res is ta n ce  against 
the Communist o f fe n s iv e  and SukarnoTs trend to the l e f t .
In 1965 the power r e a l i t i e s  are more d i f f i c u l t  to assess . The 
aksi sepihak (u n i la te ra l  a ct ion ) o f fe n s iv e  o f  the PKI had provoked a 
strong conservative  backlash and had la rg e ly  put the PKI on the de fen ­
s ive  in the countryside o f  Java and B a l i , 80 but the party c e r ta in ly  in ­
creased i t s  in flu ence  in c a p i t a l - l e v e l  p o l i t i c s .  On the other hand, 
the Army’ s res is ta n ce  to A i d i t ’ s demand to arm the workers and peas­
ants, the formation o f  a Nasakom ca b in et , Nasakomization o f  the armed 
fo r c e s ,  and f i n a l l y ,  to Sukarno’ s suggestion  o f  a ’ ’F ifth  F o r c e ,” may 
outwardly substantia te  the claim that the PKI o f fe n s iv e  had been con­
tained.
It  is  in c o r r e c t ,  however, to look at these moves o f  the Army as 
in d ica t ion s  o f  a b a s i c a l ly  unchanged balance o f  power, fo r  they c o n s t i ­
tuted defensive  moves , a holding op era tion , during a time o f  p o l i t i c a l  
o f fe n s iv e  by the PKI and Sukarno. In terms o f  weapons the Army was 
indeed the strongest  fo rce  in the country, and the PKI and Sukarno 
knew th is .  Their s tra teg y , th e re fo re ,  was to keep p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  
with th e ir  adversaries below the le v e l  o f  p h ysica l v i o l e n c e ,81 so the 
Army would have no leg it im ate  reason to bring the leverage o f  i t s  guns 
to bear on the s itu a t io n .
Sukarno and the PKI were aware o f  the strength o f  the conservative  
f o r c e s ,  and th e ir  stra tegy  was to prevent an open p o l i t i c a l  show-down, 
which might lead to an armed c o n f l i c t  they were sure to lo s e .  Since 
Sukarno lacked absolute power, he could  not simply decree the desired  
p o l i t i c a l  changes, fo r  they would have been met by evasion and sabo­
tage. The only stra tegy  open to him was to  work fo r  gradual change in 
the superstructure and to a l ly  h im self  with the popu lation , in order 
to e f f e c t  a p o l i t i c a l  r e o r ie n ta t io n  o f  the whole system. Sukarno and 
the PKI seemed to be in tent on using both governmental a ct ion  from the 
top and mass pressure from below to change the balance o f  power gradu­
a l ly  in th e ir  favor . In th e ir  s tra tegy  the con tro l  o f  the bureaucracy
which had supported the BPS, charging that the movement had been used by the 
CIA to overthrow him. The Djakarta newspapers banned the next day were:
79. In January 1965 Pandu Kartawiguna and Zein Effendi, respectively chairman and 
member of the Executive Board of Antara, and Murba members with SOKSI connec­
tions, were temporarily suspended from their duties.
80. See Jacob Walkin, ”The Moslem-Communist Confrontation in East Java,” Orbis, Vol. 
13, No. 3 (Fall 1969), pp. 822-847, and Mortimer, "The Ideology," ch. VII, pp. 
48-49 and ch. VII generally for the PKI’ s agrarian policy.
81. Compare Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and China" in Tang Tsou (ed.),
China in Crisis, Vol. 2: Chinafs Policies in Asia and Americafs Alternatives 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 382-383.
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and the leg a l in s t i t u t io n s  would u lt im a te ly  be more important than the 
p ossess ion  o f  guns.
P o l i t i c a l  i s o la t i o n ,  rather than ou tr igh t attack  on th e ir  adver­
s a r ie s ,  was th ere fore  the main thrust o f  the Sukarno-PKI stra teg y .
They intended to erode th e ir  opponents1 p o l i t i c a l  support, by subvert­
ing l o y a l t i e s ,  cracking org a n iza t ion a l u n ity ,  and accentuating in h er­
ent c o n tra d ic t io n s .  They emphasized that a c le a r  d iv id in g  l in e  had to 
be drawn between the enemies and the fr ien ds  o f  the r e v o lu t i o n ,82 and 
gave the impression that the progress o f  the rev o lu t io n  was b locked  
merely by a m inority  o f  reaction ary  nd ie -h a rd sn and co n serv a t iv es ,  who 
were f ig h t in g  a lo s in g  b a t t le  to stem the t id e ,  whereas the great mass 
o f  the population  wanted to  go ahead with i t .  Unity o f  the masses 
under the Nasakom plan had to be fo rg ed , the "cou n terrevo lu t ion a ry "  
elements had to be unmasked and cornered , and moral and p o l i t i c a l  
pressure had to be brought on them e ith e r  to "ad ju st  to the r is in g  
demands o f  the re v o lu t io n "  or be l e f t  b e h in d .83
C o n f l ic t  between the "enemies" and the " f r ie n d s "  o f  the re v o lu ­
t ion  was seen by the PKI as a kind o f  co n fron ta t ion . In terms which 
are s t r ik in g ly  s im ila r  to Mao T se-tung ! s On the Correct Handling of 
Contradictions among the People , 8  ^ the PKI saw the Indonesian s i t u a ­
t ion  o f  1965 as a c o n tra d ic t io n  between the "pro -p eop le  f o r c e s "  and 
the "a n t i -p e o p le  f o r c e s . "  The "p ro -p eop le  fo r c e s "  were vaguely defined  
as a l l  those who supported Nasakom unity and the progress o f  the rev o ­
lu t io n ,  while the "a n t i -p e o p le  f o r c e s "  s p e c i f i c a l l y  in the domestic 
context were seen as the " c a p i t a l is t -b u r e a u c r a ts "  (kabir),85 the
82. See Sukarno's 1964 Independence Day speech, "Tahun vivere pericoloso," especial­
ly the first  of his "revolutionary laws" advanced there.
83. See Subandrio's speech on January 5, 1965, Teman jang djadi Kontra-Revolusioner 
terpaksa kita tinggalkan ([Djakarta]: Departemen Penerangan R.I., Penerbitan 
Chusus No. 357, [1965]). See also Aidit's remarks at the reception for the 45th 
anniversary of the PKI on May 26, 1965 in the Aula of the Bank Indonesia, re­
printed in Harian Rakjat, May 27, 1965.
84. See Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People 
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957). The Indonesian translation of this 
booklet, Mengurus setjara tepat kontradiksi dikalangan Rakjat, is among the 
books on Marxism which Njoto in a speech to the political education course of 
Kotrar recommended as general introductory reading (Harian Rakjat, February 15, 
1965).
85. The term "capitalist-bureaucrat" (kabir) was used widely by the PKI in 1965 to
single out army members entrenched in economic positions in the state enter­
prises, and bureaucrats whose jobs allowed for embezzlement and other sources
of illegal income. They were together referred to as the dinast.i ekonomi. The 
PKI seems to have borrowed the term from Chinese Communism, where it  had been 
applied to the Chinese big bourgeoisie. This class, interchangeably called 
"comprador bourgeoisie" and "bureaucrat-capitalist class," was seen as a par­
ticular representative of monopoly capital in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial soci­
ety, having close political and economic ties to state power and foreign imperi­
alism: compare Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1961), Vol. IV, pp. 118, n. 167, 367, 398, and Li Wei-han, "The Chinese People's
Democratic United Front: Its Special Features," Peking Review, 34 (August 24,
1961), p. 15.
The application of the term "capitalist-bureaucrat" in Indonesia was a bit 
a rt if ic ia l, since thfe Indonesian "comprador bourgeoisie" was certainly weak i f
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"T ro tzk y ite  groups" (a re feren ce  to the Murba p a r t y )86 and the feudal 
la n d lord s , together with th e ir  fo re ig n  im p e r ia l is t  and r e v i s i o n i s t  
b a c k e r s .87 While the PKI recognized  that there were s t i l l  c o n tr a d ic ­
t ions  among the various members w ithin the Nasakom c o a l i t i o n ,  i t  
claimed that these were con tra d ic t ion s  among the people (kontradiksi2 
dikalangan Rakjat) ,  which were n on -a n ta g on ist ic  and could be solved  
through con su lta tion  {musjawarah), while the co n tra d ic t ion s  "between 
the people and the enemies o f  the people"  {kontvadiksi2 antara Rakjat 
dengan musuh2 Rakjat) were a n ta gon is t ic  and had to be so lved  through 
con fron tat ion  (konfrontasi).8* The PKI not only  d i f f e r e n t ia t e d  between 
"a n t i -p e o p le "  and "p ro -p eop le "  fo rces  in Indonesian s o c i e t y ,  but a lso  
tended to analyze the nature o f  s ta te  power in the n on -c lass  terms o f  
a c o n tra d ic t io n  between a "p ro -p eop le  aspect"  and an "a n t i -p e o p le  a s ­
p e c t . " 89 The "pro -p eop le  aspect"  was represented by Sukarno, other 
p ro g re ss iv e s ,  and governmental agencies who took the side o f  the 
people and acted on b eh a lf  o f  the revo lu tion ary  demands o f  the masses, 
while the "a n t i -p e o p le  aspect"  was represented by the "cou n terrev o lu ­
t io n a r ie s "  s t i l l  entrenched in governmental p o s i t io n s .  In the PKI 
estimate o f  the balance o f  fo r ce s  in 1965, the "p ro -p eop le  aspect"  was 
gaining ascendency over the "a n t i -p e o p le  a s p e c t ,"  which was becoming 
in crea s in g ly  i s o la t e d ,  because domestic and fo re ig n  p o l i c y  were in ­
crea s in g ly  shaped by the demands o f  the m asses.90
compared with that of Kuomintang China. In terms of class analysis it  certainly 
applied better to the Indonesian Chinese capitalists than to the group of Army 
representatives in economic positions and embezzling bureaucrats, which the PKI 
wanted to single out. However, not socio-economic analysis but political con­
siderations were responsible for the PKI ’ s use of the term. It intended to high­
light the foreign ties of this group with imperialism, and in this context it 
was certainly accurate. For an important attempt to define the economic and 
political interests of the capitalist-bureaucrats, where the parallels to the Kuo­
mintang and Chiang Kai-shek1s coup of 1927 are repeatedly invoked, see the edi­
torial of Bintang Timur, Februaiy 23, 1965.
86. On the PKI view of the Murba party as a "counterrevolutionary," rightist p o l it i ­
cal group, see Harian Rakjat, editorial, January 8, 1965; see also Tesis 45 Tahun 
PKI (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1965), pp. 12-13. See also note 115 below.
87. The relationship between the domestic "counterrevolutionaries," especially the 
"capitalist-bureaucrats" and the "Trotzkyite groups," and their foreign backers 
was stressed repeatedly by the PKI. See for example the New Year's message of 
the PKI Central Committee in Harian Rakjat, Jan. 1, 1965, "Djadikan 1965 Tahun 
mengganjang Kapitalis Birokrat dan Melaksanakan Dekon untuk memenangkan Dwikora!" 
See also Bintang Timur, editorial, Jan. 5, 1965.
88. See Aiditfs speech at the reception for the 45th anniversary of the PKI on May 
26, 1965 in the Aula of the Bank Indonesia, Harian Rakjat, May 27, 1965; see 
also Aiditfs political report to the Fourth Plenary Session of the PKI Central 
Committee on May 11, 1965, in Perhebat Qfensif Revolusioner Disegala Bidang! 
(Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1965), p. 11.
89. On Aidit's development of these concepts, see his The Indonesian Revolution and 
the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party^of Indonesia (Peking: Foreign Lan­
guages Press, 1964), esp. pp. 35-36, 40-43, 80-88, and 124-127. A general 
assessment of the PKI theory of state power is given in Rex Mortimer, "The Ide- 
ology," ch. I i ,  pp. 82-90.
90. See Tesis 45 Tahun PKI, pp. 15-16 (thesis No. 12), and Aidit, Perhebat Qfensif 
Revolusioner, pp. 16-17.
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The Turn to the L e ft :  I d e o lo g ic a l
and P o l i t i c a l  Changes, 1964-5
It  is  leg it im ate  to ask whether th is  PKI eva luation  o f  a changing 
balance o f  power in favor o f  the Left was an example o f  ffp o s i t iv e  
th ink ing1’ and merely a morale boost fo r  party members, or whether i t  
could  claim to portray  r e a l i t y .  The p ic tu re  Legge gives is  that the 
power r e a l i t i e s  had not r e a l ly  changed, while I argue that they had, 
because conservative  p o s it io n s  were s e r io u s ly  undermined.
The change is  d i f f i c u l t  to p erce iv e  in the beginning, because the 
Sukarno-PKI stra tegy  was one o f  gradual changes and subversive t a c t i c s  
rather than an open challenge o f  power. A more ra d ica l  p o l i t i c a l  trend 
was in i t ia t e d  by the Left with these changes. They were more c le a r ly  
f e l t  at the le v e l  o f  ca p ita l  p o l i t i c s  and in the b ig  c i t i e s  o f  Java 
than in the outer is lands and in the countryside . By the time 
o f  the coup they were s t i l l  incom plete , and the trend was immediately 
stopped by the cou n terrevo lu t ion  a f te r  the coup. But these changes to 
the l e f t  and the p o te n t ia l  future s o c ia l  transform ations they f o r e ­
shadowed dominated pre-coup Indonesian p o l i t i c s .
The argument that id e o lo g ic a l  changes in i t ia t e d  p o l i t i c a l  changes 
is  viewed s k e p t ic a l ly  by those who fo l lo w  the orthodox approach that 
the id eo logy  o f  Guided Democracy always was a ’ ’smokescreen” f o r  essen ­
t i a l l y  conservative  status quo p o l i t i c s .  However, there was a con­
scious attempt on the part o f  Sukarno and the PKI to re in te rp re t  the 
in teg ra t iv e  symbols o f  the id eo logy  o f  the Indonesian Revolution in a 
r a d i c a l - l e f t i s t  v e in , and to co in  new slogans which no longer produced 
con form ity , but induced p o l i t i c a l  change.
In a l l  the preeminent slogans o f  1965 the theme s tressed  was that 
the Indonesian Revolution should be a ’ ’ l e f t  r e v o lu t io n ” (revolusi jang 
kiri) , a ’ ’p e o p le ’ s r e v o lu t i o n . ” To be progressif-revolusioner was the 
order o f  the day. P o l i t i c a l  cartoons conveyed p ic tu res  o f  the Indone­
sian s ta te -c o a c h , with Sukarno as the d r iv er  supported by the people 
in Nasakom unity, taking a d i s t in c t  swerve to the l e f t  towards some 
kind o f  future Indonesian s o c ia l is m , the sudden swerve causing cou n ter­
rev o lu t ion a r ie s  and h y p o c r i t i c a l  elements to f a l l  ov erb oa rd .91 The 
id e o lo g ic a l  slogans which were most prominent r e f l e c t e d  th is  sudden 
s h i f t  o f  d ir e c t io n  and focused on themes the Indonesian Left could  
f u l l y  support, but to which the Right could only pay l i p - s e r v i c e .
Formerly, Pantja S i la  was the key symbol o f  the id eo logy  and 
served as the essence o f  the sp e c ia l  Indonesian id e n t i t y ,  but during 
1964-5 Sukarno attempted to e leva te  Nasakom to the same symbolic le v e l  
as Pantja S i l a . 92 The PKI and Subandrio t r ie d  to su b st itu te  Nasakom 
fo r  Pantja S ila  as the rea l id e n t ity  o f  the Indonesian R e v o lu t io n .93
91. Compare the two cartoons in Harian Rakjat, April 19 and 24, 1965.
92. See Sukarno, Berdiri diatas kaki sendiri, p. 8; see also Sukarno’ s address to 
the Nasakom cadre course on June 1, 1965, Pertjajalah pada benarnja Nasakom! 
([Djakarta]: Departemen Penerangan R.I., Penerbitan Chusus No. 373, [1965]).
93. See Subandrio’ s speech ’’Revolusi Indonesia Revolusi Nasakom” of February 25, 
1965, before a PKI meeting in Medan as printed in Harian Rakjat, March 1, 1965. 
Subandrio stressed Nasakom as the identity (kepribadian) of the Indonesian 
Revolution.
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Nasakom was declared  a ’ ’p rogress ive  n e c e s s i t y ” o f  the Indonesian Revo­
lu t io n ,  and i t  was ch a ra cter ized  by one o f  the c h ie f  ideologues o f  the 
system as a more sublime synthesis o f  a l l  e x is t in g  p o l i t i c a l  thought 
in the twentieth century than Marxism had co n s t itu ted  fo r  the n in e ­
teenth century (s£ < ? !) .9lf Sukarno and the PKI t r ie d  to have Nasakom 
understood not only as a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  the r e a l i t y  o f  a general s o c ia l  
ist-communist alivan ( s o c io - c u l t u r a l  ’ ’ stream” ) in Indonesian s o c i e t y ,  
but a lso  as making o f f i c i a l  the PKI’ s ro le  as th is  a l i r a n ’ s proper 
p o l i t i c a l  rep resen ta t iv e .  There were repeated attempts by the a n t i ­
communist fo r ce s  to convince Sukarno to adopt a Nasamarx (tfASionalisme 
Agama, AMtfZisme) or a Nasasos (il/ASionalisme, Agama, SOSia lism e) formu­
la ,  but he refused  such re fo rm u la t io n s .94 5
Legge’ $ view o f  Nasakom as a p o l i t i c a l  t a c t i c  does not correspond 
to the d ir e c t io n  o f  1965 p o l i t i c s  when Sukarno’ s Nasakom stra tegy  was 
s t i l l  the e s s e n t ia l  leitmotiv o f  h is p o l i t i c a l  th ou g h t .96 I t  is  true 
that Sukarno may have become in crea s in g ly  aware o f  the s o c ia l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t s  which would impede r e a l iz a t io n  o f  Nasakom u n ity , 
but to the very end i t  was his p o l i t i c a l  id ea l to try  to achieve i t .
Because the Nasakom concept was crushed in a b loodbath , s k e p t i ­
cism that i t  was unworkable seems to have been confirmed. However, i f  
one imagines a development o f  Indonesian p o l i t i c s  without the ra d ica l  
changes o f  the coup, but with the gradual stra tegy  o f  Sukarno con tin u ­
ing, i t  is  p o ss ib le  that the authority  o f  the President and p e rs is te n t  
in d octr in a t ion  might have succeeded in removing ” Kom-phobia” and o v e r ­
coming the s o c ia l  stigma and p o l i t i c a l  ostracism  o f  the PKI.
The charge that a Nasakom cabinet with PKI representation  had 
not been accomplished and that the PKI th ere fo re  had not come any 
nearer to the ex erc ise  o f  genuine power, is  only h a l f  true . Rather 
than re ly in g  only on Nasakomization from ’ ’ the t o p , ” the PKI had 
a lso  s ta rted  to demand ’ ’Nasakomization” from ’ ’ the bottom .” One can 
argue that the Nasakomized film  censorship  boards, National Front 
branches, education commissions, sports teams, e t c . ,  did not have any 
rea l power. But when they slow ly s ta rted  to  permeate a l l  aspects o f  
Indonesian p u b lic  l i f e ,  they set a precedent. And when they i n f l u ­
enced the p u b lic  mass media and Nasakom -indoctrination sess ions  became 
a must fo r  m in is tr ie s  and government o f f i c i a l s ,  the in s t i t u t io n a l  p os i 
t ions  o f  the conservatives  were slow ly  being penetrated . L e g is la t iv e  
decrees t r ie d  to make Nasakom an accepted f a c t ,  a ’ ’ l iv in g  r e a l i t y ” in 
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  and forbade anti-Nasakom propaganda.97
94. See Ruslan Abdulganifs speech at the occasion of the conferring of an honorary 
doctorate degree on Sukarno at Padjadjaran University, Bandung, Dec. 23, 1964, 
in Indonesia, ajam-djantan sedjarah dunia Baru! (Djakarta: Prapantja/Universi 
tas Padjadjaran, [1965?]), p. 38.
95. See Juti [Sajuti Melik], Beladjar memahami Sukarno-isme, pp. 68-71, and his
earlier work Pembinaan Djiwa Marhaenisme (Djakarta: Jajasan B.P. "Pantjaka," 
[1963]), pp. 22-26, for attempts to rephrase Nasakom. For Sukamo*s refusal to 
go along with these anti-PKI moves, see his speech before the PKI anniversary 
mass-meeting in Senajan on May 23, 1965. 1
96. Compare Sukarno*s speeches before and after the coup in 1965 as reprinted in 
the Penerbitan Chusus series of the Information Ministry.
97. See MPRS Resolution No. VIII, 1965 in Bahan-Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi, pp. 1285- 
1295, esp. 1291.
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Besides Nasakom the other two main slogans o f  the Left were 
Pantja Azimat Revolusi (The Five Talismans o f  the Revolution) and 
T r isa k ti  Tavip (The Three Magic P r in c ip le s ) .  The f i r s t  slogan attempt­
ed to  l i s t  Pantja S i la ,  Nasakom, Manipol-USDEK, T r isa k t i  Tavip and 
B erdikari (stand on your own f e e t ,  i . e . ,  s e l f - r e l i a n c e )  as the f iv e  
major p r in c ip le s  o f  the Indonesian R evolution . In 1964-5 the conserva­
t iv e s  only f u l l y  agreed to  the f i r s t  one, because the others had in ­
crea s in g ly  ra d ica l  p o l i t i c a l  im p lica t ion s . The other s lo g a n - -T r i ­
sakti T a v ip - -r e fe r re d  to sovere ignty  in p o l i t i c s ,  economic s e l f - r e l i ­
ance and indigenous cu ltu ra l  id e n t i t y ,  which by i t s e l f  would probably 
have appealed to a l l  Indonesian n a t io n a l i s t s ,  i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  p o l i t i ­
ca l  shading. These three p r in c ip le s ,  which a ctu a lly  described  Indone­
s i a ^  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  a sp ira t io n s ,  would, however, have an immediate 
a n t i -con serv a t iv e  impact on Indonesian domestic p o l i t i c s . 98
The id e o lo g i c a l  vocabulary o f  Sukarno and the PKI became in d is ­
tingu ishable  during the f in a l  period  o f  Guided Democracy-- each i n f l u ­
encing the other. This was f a c i l i t a t e d  by the fa c t  that Njoto was 
among Sukarno1s sp eech w riters . Although Sukarno b a s i c a l ly  only 
pleaded fo r  a Mp ro g re ss iv e -n a t io n a l  unity with Nasakom as i t s  a x i s , "  
he a lso  made i t  c le a r  that he considered  the workers and peasants to 
be the p i l l a r s  o f  the r e v o lu t i o n .99 The PKI*s slogan o f  the general 
l in e  o f  the Indonesian Revolution at that time, " f in i s h  the National 
Democratic Revolution towards Indonesian Socialism  with the National 
Front, which has Nasakom as i t s  a x is ,  the workers and peasants as i t s  
p i l l a r s ,  and P a n t ja s i la  as i t s  p h ilo so p h ic a l  b a s i s ! " 100 f i n a l l y  became 
one o f  the o f f i c i a l  slogans f o r  the ce leb ra t ion s  o f  the 20th anniver­
sary o f  the Proclamation o f  Independence in 1 9 6 5 .101
The greater  emphasis given to the Indonesian Revolution as a rev o ­
lu t io n  o f  and fo r  the masses, and Sukarno*s attempt to bridge  the gap 
between the e l i t e  and the masses was expressed in an Indonesian equiva­
lent o f  the Chinese Communist mass l in e ,  the gerakan tuvun kebawah 
(turba; l i t .  " to  go down," " to  go to the lower l e v e l " ) . 102 The theme 
that the Indonesian leaders had removed themselves from the masses, 
were res t in g  on th e ir  revo lu t ion ary  la u r e ls ,  and had merely an "Impala 
consciousness" ran l ik e  a red thread through Sukarno*s speeches in the 
la s t  two years o f  Guided Democracy. He was in tent on bridg ing  the gap 
between the e l i t e  and the masses by c a l l in g  fo r  a new, rev o lu t ion a ry , 
"a n t i -b u re a u cra t ic  work s t y l e . "
98. See below, pp. 140-141.
99. Sukarno, Tjapailah Bintang, p. 23..
100. ,,Dengan Front Nasional Berporoskan Nasakom, Bersokoguru Buruh dan Tani, Ber- 
landasan id i i l  Pantja Sila, menjelesaikan Revolusi Nasional Demokratis menudju 
Sosialisme Indonesia."
101. See the joint instructions of the Minister/Chairman of the Committee to organ­
ize the Independence Day festivities and the Leadership Council of the National 
Front determining the slogans for the 1965 Independence Day, Instruksi Bersama, 
Menteri/Sekretaris Negara/Ketua Panitya Penjelenggaraan Perajaan Hari Kemerde- 
kaan Indonesia dan Pengurus Besar Front Nasional ([Djakarta]: n.p., [1965]).
102. The Chinese equivalent is hsia fang, i . e . ,  "sending down" or "transfer down." 
For its importance in Chinese Communism, see Rensselaer W. Lee III, "The Hsia 
Fang System: Marxism and Modernization," China Quarterly, No. 28 (October- 
December 1966), pp. 40-62.
136
The idea that a leader should Mgo down" to the masses and learn 
from them had much e a r l i e r  been proclaimed by Sukarno in h is  admira­
t ion  fo r  Alexander Herzen and Russian p op u lism ,103 and he may have 
taken i t  up again now a f te r  a PKI i n i t i a t i v e . 104 Sukarno c a l le d  on 
the Indonesian leaders to leave th e ir  o f f i c e s  and learn from the 
masses, which was the only way to become "a true r e v o lu t io n a r y . " 105 
This l in e  squared w ell with the PKI demand to " in te g ra te  o n e s e l f  with 
the masses and the r e v o lu t io n ,"  and i t  n a tu ra lly  had f u l l  PKI sup­
p o r t . 106 In the f i r s t  s p e c ia l  turba seminar o f  the National Front in 
1965, the turba w ork -sty le  was e x p l i c i t l y  linked to the issue o f  s o ­
c ia l  m o b i l i z a t i o n .107 Although the coup in terrupted  any fu rth er  plans 
fo r  turba, in the context o f  Javanese p r i j a j i  p o l i t i c s  the very idea 
o f  learning from the masses, not to mention a ctu a lly  going down to the 
masses, already had revo lu t ion ary  cu ltu ra l  im p lica t ion s .
S t i l l  one can ask whether the l e f t i s t  trend o f  id e o lo g ic a l  con­
tent and the increasing  in d o c tr in a t io n  had any rea l e f f e c t  on the 
p o l i t i c a l  p rocess ,  and whether they were not dea lt  with by the a n ti-  
Sukarno and anti-PKI fo r ce s  in the usual way: through double ta lk ,
subtle  techniques o f  p o l i t i c a l  sabotage or simple evasion . Although 
these techniques had guaranteed p o l i t i c a l  surv iva l in the e a r l ie r  
period  o f  Guided Democracy, in the h ighly  charged p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere 
o f  1964-5 they were no longer s u f f i c i e n t .  At that time in Indonesia 
an intense p o l i t i c a l  b ip o la r iz a t io n  was developing and the pressures 
on the ind iv idua l to take s ides  became very in tense . Amidst p o l i t i c a l  
confusion  and economic chaos, people faced  an agonizing ch o ice .  As 
one sch olar  has remarked: " I t  became less  and less  p o ss ib le  to avoid
declar ing  fo r  e ith e r  Right or L e ft ,  and the probable penalty o f  making 
a wrong choice  grew higher. A ll ia n ces  and a l leg ia n ces  changed rap id ly  
as people attempted to hedge th e ir  p o l i t i c a l  b e t s . " 108
In the Indonesia o f  1965 the content o f  p o l i t i c a l  id eo logy  was 
changing markedly. Because the President supported the Left and l e g i t ­
imized these moves, the country was pressured to fo l lo w  s u i t .  Even i f
103. See Sukarno, Sarinah, pp. 305-306.
104. Compare Aiditfs speech to the conference on revolutionary art and literature 
on Sept. 1, 1964, in Harian Rakjat, Feb. 7, 1965.
105. In a letter of June 10, 1965 to the participants of the Nasakom cadre course 
then going on in the capital, Sukarno wrote that the intention of the turba 
movement was to "eliminate the bureaucratic spirit (mengikis-habis semangat 
amtenar) , to throw out the leadership style from behind the desk, to become a 
leader of the people who not only is smart to teach the masses but also smart 
to ±earn from the masses." See Harian Rakjat, June 11, 1965. Subandrio later 
reminded technocrats and specialists that they should stop their "conventional 
thinking" and carry out a "mental revolution" to carry out turba: see his 
speech on August 19, 1965 before bank o ffic ia ls , Bank2 di-integrasikan dalam 
revolusi ([Djakarta]: Bank Negara Indonesia, Bagian Hubungan Masjarakat,
[1965]).
106. See Anwar Sanusi's talk before the Nasakonv cadre course, June 3, 1965 in Harian 
Rakjat, June 19, 1965.
107. See Dengan Turba mendjalankan Revolusi-dalam-tjara-bekerdja ([Djakarta]: Front 
Nasional, Pengurus Besar, 1965).
108. Ruth McVey, "Indonesian Communism and China," p. 377.
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the conservative  fo r ce s  r e s is te d  the trend, in p u b lic  d ialogue they 
had to  use the p rescr ibed  s logan s, i f  only to use them as double ta lk . 
The sch izoph ren ic  pressures on in d iv id u a ls  increased . One can imagine 
that i f  the Sukarno-PKI in d o c tr in a t io n  had had more time, more and 
more people fo r  reasons o f  sheer opportunism, p o l i t i c a l  p r o te c t io n  or 
p la in  in e r t ia  would have jumped on the bandwagon and "ad ju sted  themselves 
to the r is in g  demands o f  the r e v o lu t io n ."  The new trend o f  p o l i t i c s  
slow ly  permeated a l l  aspects o f  l i f e .  Even the research o f  the techno­
crats  was determined by the p re v a i l in g  s p i r i t  o f  the t im e s .109 P o l i t i c s  
had taken command ("Politik adalah panglima" ) , and i t  was necessary to 
show that one was both "red "  and " e x p e r t . "
The p o l i t i c a l  changes which came in the wake o f  the id e o lo g i c a l  
r e o r ie n ta t io n  did not immediately r e s u lt  in an open loss  o f  power fo r  
the con serv a t iv es ,  but th e ir  power was gradually  d e f la te d .  On the 
c a p ita l  le v e l  a major attempt was made by Sukarno and the PKI to win 
con tro l  over p u b lic  op in ion  and to s i le n c e  th e ir  opponents. The tempo­
rary suspension o f  former BPS newspapers and the slow Nasakomization 
o f  the Antara news agency has already been described  as a major s e t ­
back f o r  the con s e rv a t iv e s110 although i t  was p a r t ia l l y  o f f s e t  by the 
Army d e c is io n  to s ta r t  newspapers on i t s  own or simply to take over 
former BPS newspapers.111 It  was a p a r t ia l  help fo r  the L e ft ,  when 
Hsinhua news agency in 1965 emerged as the major su p p lier  o f  fo re ig n  
news fo r  Antara and the Indonesian p ress ,  putting out lengthy d a i ly  
mimeographed news b u l le t in s  fre e  o f  charge.
The major new aspect o f  in d o c tr in a t io n  during th is  per iod  was 
that in Sukarno’ s attempt to  en force  a Nasakom consensus, the PKI was 
given o f f i c i a l  backing and ample opportunity  to spread in d o ctr in a t io n  
on Marxism even to the governmental l e v e l .  In d octr in a tion  courses and 
tra in in g  sess ions fo r  m in is tr ie s  and governmental in s t i t u t io n s  in
109. See for example Subroto and Ali Wardhana, Kerdjasama Ekonomi Antar-NEFOS (Dja­
karta: Lembaga Penjelidikan Ekonomi dan Masjarakat, Fakultas Ekonomi Universi- 
tas Indonesia, 1965); Widjojo Nitisastro et a l . , Masaiah Ekonomi dan Faktor2 
Ipolsos (Ideologi, Politik, Sosial) (Djakarta: Leknas, 1965); Selo Sumardjan, 
Perkembangan politik sebagai penggerak dinamik pembangunan ekonomi ( [Dj akarta]: 
Universitas Indonesia, Jajasan Badan Penerbit, [1965]); and Fuad Hassan, Iden- 
titas nasional (Djakarta: Departemen Urusan Research Nasional, Madjelis Ilmu 
Pengetahuan Indonesia, Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasjarakatan Nasional, 1965). For 
the effect of Communist analytical terms and Sukarno!s vocabulary on the mili­
tary, see for example Major-General S. Sokowati, Amalkan Tri-Ubaya-Cakti ([Dja­
karta?]: Staf Umum Angkatan Darat-5, [1965]), where world politics is analyzed 
in terms of Communist contradictions theory (especially p. 23). For the use of 
Communist contradictions theory in military publications, see also Doktrin Per- 
djuangan TNI MTri Ubaya Cakti" (Results of the Army Seminar, April 2-9, 1965, 
in the Army Staff and Command School, Bandung) ([Djakarta]: Pengurus Besar 
Front Nasional, Bagian Indoprop, No. 04, [1965]) and the National Defense In­
stitute study by Air Marshal Suharnoko Harbani, Vichaksana Yudha, Pandangan 
Positip tentang pemutusan Garis Hidup Imperialisme ([Djakarta]: Lembaga Perta- 
hanan Nasional [July 1965]), stenciled.
110. See above, notes 78 and 79.
111. When the Murba paper Berita Indonesia was closed down, the Army simply took 
over the editorial staff and the publishing facilit ies  and ran it  as an Army 
newspaper under the name of Berita Yudha. The Army paper Angkatan Bersendjata 
started publication on March 15, 1965.
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Djakarta contained standard le c tu res  on Marxism, and they complemented 
the PKIf s e a r l i e r  p o l i c y  to address the p o l i c e  and the armed fo rces  on 
the s u b je c t .112 The attempt to make Marxism accepted o f f i c i a l l y  as a 
cen tra l part o f  the ideo logy  o f  the Indonesian Revolution was, o f  
course , r e s i s te d ,  but i t  is  questionable  to what extent the conserva­
t iv e s  could have f i n a l l y  r e s is te d  a trend which was le g it im ize d  by 
Sukarno*s backing and which slow ly made inroads on the in s t i t u t io n s  o f  
p u b lic  opinion  and e d u ca t io n .113
The pressures to adjust to the ’ ’ revo lu tion ary  c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n ” and 
the ’ ’ r is in g  demands o f  the re v o lu t io n ” were a lso  f e l t  by the remaining 
Indonesian p a r t ie s .  Although one cannot c a l l  i t  a gleiohsohaltung, 
id e o lo g ic a l  and p o l i t i c a l  pressures were brought to bear to ’ ’ r e t o o l ” 11* 
personnel and adjust th e ir  programs. The Murba party was f in a l l y  
banned in September 1965. Although the party was in s ig n i f i c a n t  in 
terms o f  members, i t  was an important enemy o f  the PKI because o f  i t s  
e l i t e  com position , i t s  share o f  ’ ’ c a p i t a l i s t -b u r e a u c r a t s , ” i t s  Army con­
n e ct ion s , and e s p e c ia l ly  i t s  r e la t io n s  to ’ ’modern re v is io n is m .” 115 As
112. See D. N. Aidit, PKI dan Angkatan Darat (SESKQAD) (Djakarta: Jajasan ’’Pemba­
ruan,” 1963) and Angkatan Bersendjata dan Penjesuaian Kekuasaan Negara dengan 
Tugas2 Revolusi (PKI dan Angkatan Darat SESKQAD) II (Djakarta: Jajasan ’’Pemba- 
ruan,n 1964); PKI dan ALRI (SESKOAL) (Djakarta: Jajasan ’’Pembaruan,” 1963) and 
Marxisme dan Pembinaan Nasion Indonesia (PKI dan ALRI) II (Djakarta: Jajasan 
’’Pembaruan,” 1965); PKI dan AURI (Djakarta: Jajasan ’’Pembaruan,” 1963) and 
Revolusi, Angkatan Bersendjata § Partai Komunis (PKI dan AURI) II (Djakarta: 
Jajasan ’’Pembaruan,” 1964); PKI dan Polisi (Djakarta: Jajasan ’’Pembaruan,” 
1963).
113. Aidit and Njoto, for example, were appointed as professors of Marxism in the 
newly founded National Defense Institute (Lembaga Pertahanan Negara). See 
Ampera Review, Vol. 2, No. 5 (May 1965), p. 24; Antara, May 7, 1965, B. In the 
field of education Ruslan Abdulgani’ s instruction for the inclusion of Marxism 
as one of the basic subjects in all the faculties of the Teacher’ s Training 
Institute (IKIP) in Bandung could have set a precedent, see Antara, March 6,
May 17, 1965, B. In the o ffic ia l slogans for the 20th anniversary of the 
Proclamation of Independence, Marxism was hailed as "a science competent to 
solve political, social and historical problems.” See Instruksi Bersama cited 
at note 101 above.
114. Sukarno’ s use of the word ’’retool” seems to be a mere euphemism for ’’purge.”
For the attempt at a definition see Presidential Decision No. 240/1964 on the 
duties and organization of the new ’’High Command for the Retooling of the In­
struments of the Revolution” (Komando Tertinggi Retooling Alat Revolusi) in 
Himpunan2 Keputusan Penting mengenai Komando Tertinggi Retooling Alat Revolusi 
(Djakarta: Kotrar, Penerbitan Chusus No. 2, 1964), p. 8: ’’ ’ Retooling* adalah
pembongkaran susunan peralatan jang tidak effisien, dengan pengertian susunan 
peralatan jang baru.”
115. In the context of Sukarno’ s foreign policy cooperation with China, which the 
PKI backed and which the Soviet Union wanted to contain, the Murba party’ s pro- 
Soviet line became especially dangerous to the PKI because it could have en­
couraged a dissenting pro-Moscow group in /the PKI itse lf .  In 1964-5 Moscow was 
increasingly losing its influence on the PKI and seems to have looked to the 
Murba party (and former PSI elements) to gain leverage on the Indonesian scene. 
Murba’ s strength did not lie  in its membership figures, but in its elite repre­
sentation. The Soviets had good ties to Adam Malik (former ambassador to 
Moscow, 1960-1963) and probably also to Sukarni Kartodiwirjo, the Murba
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another observer has pointed  ou t ,116 changes within the PNI at that time 
a lso  r e f le c t e d  genuine l e f t i s t  pressures e s p e c ia l ly  from the youth 
organ ization  and the small ra d ica l  wing o f  a party which h ith er to  
could have been s a fe ly  la b e led  as con serv a t iv e -b u rea u cra t ic .  There 
were a lso  minor leadership  changes in P e r t i ,  Partindo and IPKI in favor 
o f  the l e f t i s t s . 117 Only the NU, one o f  the Nasakom p a r t ie s ,  seems to 
have avoided in tern a l in te r fe re n ce .
Sukarno’ s emphasis on the Indonesian Revolution as a " p e o p le ’ s 
r e v o lu t io n , " the increasing  mass demonstrations against se le c te d  groups 
l ik e  the " c a p i t a l is t -b u r e a u c r a ts "  (kabir) and in d iv id u a l m inisters 
(Adam Malik, Chaerul S a leh ), and demands to purge the governmental 
structure  from "cou n terrevo lu t ion a ry  elements" created  a p o l i t i c a l  a t ­
mosphere where the government came under increasing  p u b lic  pressure 
and scru tin y . This p u b lic  pressure on the conservative  strongholds o f  
the government was prim arily  m anifested in s t r e e t  dem onstrations, p e t i ­
t io n s ,  and b oy co tt  a ct ion s  led by the PKI, which now demanded govern­
mental performance in accordance with the new ra d ica l  id eo log y . The 
area where th is  PKI-led mass pressure became most apparent was in the 
ju d i c ia l  system.
The idea o f  an independent ju d ic ia r y  in Indonesia slow ly eroded 
during that time, making way fo r  a new concept o f  " rev o lu t ion a ry "  
j u s t i c e . "  This movement had o r ig in s  in Sukarno! s and A i d i t 1s 118 r e ­
minder to the law -en forcing  p o l i c e  " to  s ide  with the peop le"  and to 
elim inate "p e o p le -p h o b ia ."  It  is  a lso  evident that A id it  thought that 
some Indonesian laws had already become ob so le te  in the present rev o ­
lu tion ary  s itu a t io n  and that new "p ro g re ss iv e "  c r i t e r i a  had to be found
chairman, whose two children were studying in Moscow. Both Malik and Sukarni 
were important members of the Angkatan f45 and Malik was close to the President.
The PKI leadership was not only concerned about Moscow1s support of Murba, 
but also about Murbafs good relations with the Army and the Army union federation, 
SOKSI. This Army support of Murba materialized after the ban on the BPS, when 
many Murba members got Army protection and employment. In June 1965 some 
Murba elements started a secret newsbulletin with the t it le  Observation, which 
was stenciled and apparently distributed among former members. The political 
analyses in Observation were primarily anti-Peking and anti-PKI, and praised 
the Soviet domestic and foreign policy line: see reprint from Observation in 
the stenciled Army intelligence bulletin Laporan Situasi, No. 004/CLS/1965 
[Djakarta].
116. See J. Eliseo Rocamora, "The Partai Nasional Indonesia, 1963-1965,” Indonesia, 
No. 10 (October 1970), pp. 143-181,.
117. In Perti, H. Rusli was replaced as chairman by K. H. Siradjuddin Abbas; in Par­
tindo, Asmara Hadi had Sukarno’ s support over the Dr. Buntaran-Winarno group 
from Bandung; in IPKI, the anti-Communist chairman Sugirman was replaced by the 
(salon-) radical Mrs. H. Aminah Hidajat at the IPKI plenary session in Lembang 
(May 20-25, 1965). She was, however, s t i l l  balanced by the three ’’rightist" 
vice-chairmen, Drs. Achmad Sukendro, Achmad Sukarmidj-aja and Sadikin as well
as by secretary-general Dr. Sutopo. For the programs of these smaller parties, 
see Almanak Lembaga2 Negara dan Kepartaian ([Djakarta]: Departemen Penerangan, 
Republik Indonesia, [1961]).
118. See Sukarno’ s address to the all-Indonesia police commanders* working confer­
ence, August 31, 1965, in Antara, Sept. 2, 1965, A; and Aidit*s remarks before 
police officers at the Police Academy in Sukabumi, in Harian Rakjat, Dec. 18, 
1964.
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to determine violation of laws.119 This was supported by Subandrio,120 12
and the countryTs Attorney-General, Minister Brigadier-General Sutar- 
dhio. He felt compelled to ask the country's prosecutors to solve 
problems in an ’’unconventional way.,f121 One example of such "revolu- 
tionary justice,” where the judiciary came under the influence of mass 
pressures from below, was the aftermath of the so-called Bandar Betsy 
Affair.122 In a highly charged political atmosphere, capital politics 
in September 1965 witnessed the start of a political denunciation cam­
paign. 123
While these ideological and political changes were taking effect 
on the capital level and set a leftward trend, other, more profound 
changes were outlined in Sukarno's major speech of 1965. The politi­
cal reorientation Sukarno charted in his Berdikari speech to the MPRS 
in April 1965 testifies to his inclination to integrate foreign and 
domestic policy. Although the Berdikari speech mainly related a plan 
to create a self-reliant economy with domestic capital accumulation, 
it contained clear references to extending the idea of self-reliance 
to the fields of culture, education, military defense doctrines and 
armament, and elsewhere. These proposals should be seen in the con­
text of Sukarno1s fear of political subversion, military intervention 
and Western cultural penetration, and the apprehension that his domes­
tic opponents, especially the Army, would attempt a coup with foreign
119. Aiditfs remarks before police members in Kebajoran Baru, March 10, 1965, in 
Antara, March 11, 1965, B; see also A idit’ s address to a congress of judges,
” Djadikan hukum dan hakim alat revolusi,” in Harian Rakjat, April 5, 1965.
120. Address to judges from all over Indonesia, in Antara, August 24, 1965, A.
121. Address at the opening of the Third All-Djambi Prosecutors* Working Conference, 
July 17, 1965, in Antara, July 21, 1965, B.
122. On May 14, 1965, a second lieutenant of the Army, assigned to duty on a govern­
ment-owned plantation at Bandar Betsy (Simelungun, North Sumatra) was clubbed 
to death when he tried to evict a group of peasants and youth cultivating land 
belonging to the plantation. In June 1965, 36 peasants were sentenced to 
prison terms ranging from 5 to 15 years by the Pematang Siantar d istrict court. 
This triggered o ff a polemical newspaper debate in the country and after peti­
tions and protests the government instructed the higher court in Medan to re­
view the case (July 4). Members of the court were summoned to the capital, 
and a spokesman for the court announced that the high court would base its 
consideration in this case ’’not on pure justice alone, but also take due ac­
count of the statements and expressions, of society’ s sense of justice ." See 
Antara, June 25, 1965, A; July 5, 1965, B; July 24, 1965, A; see also Indone­
sian Herald, July 7, 1965.
123. In September the Attorney-General appealed to the public to pinpoint economic 
"corruptors" to the authorities (Antara, Sept. 4, 1965, B), and the Djakarta 
Raya police opened its doors for 24 hours to receive reports from the public 
on "irresponsible" activities of "kabir" and "economic dynasty" elements 
(Antara, Sept. 25, 1965, B). There were also repeated proposals from govern­
ment o ffic ia ls  to shoot "big caliber manipulators" and "economic criminals" 
before a firing squad (Antara, Sept. 12, A-B; Sept. 27, B). For A idit’ s sug­
gestion for a "Gerakan Melapor" (reporting movement) and a system of rewards 
and protection for denunciators, see his speech to the p olitica l education 
course of Kotrar, Sept. 16, 1965, in Harian Rakjat, Sept. 17, 1965.
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p o l i t i c a l  and f in a n c ia l b a ck in g .124
The B erdikari p o licy , t h e r e fo r e , beyond i t s  immediate economic 
im p lica tio n s , was an attempt to is o la t e  h is  dom estic p o l i t i c a l  oppo­
nents from th e ir  fo re ig n  im p e r ia lis t  and r e v is io n is t  su p p orters. The 
term ination  o f  Indonesian student exchanges with the United S ta tes , 
the expu lsion  o f  the Peace Corps, the shutting down o f  USIS l ib r a r ie s  
and the o f f i c e s  o f  the Ford Foundation, and the reminder to the Army 
to renounce i t s  Western m ilita ry  tra in in g  and defense c o n c e p t s - -a l l  
these moves were a ction s against the dom estic opponents o f  the Sukarno- 
PKI a ll ia n c e .
The Indonesian Coup and Sukarno1s P o l i t i c s  in P ersp ective
In view o f  these dom estic changes in pre-coup  Indonesia , I think 
i t  can no longer be m aintained that Sukarno was "b a la n c in g ,” that h is 
a llia n c e  with the Army was s t i l l  in ta c t , or that he was a con servative  
p ro te c t in g  the status quo. A p o l i t i c a l  change to the l e f t  was c le a r ly  
apparent, and i t  was c le a r ly  p erce ived  by Indonesians as such.
The d if fe r e n c e  in in te rp re ta tio n  between the view that nothing 
had r e a lly  changed in the con servative  ch aracter o f  the system and i t s  
lea d er , and the more ra d ica l view o f  Sukarno and the la te  p eriod  o f  
Guided Democracy d erives  from the fo llo w in g  c o n f l i c t  in  evaluating  
id eo logy  and p o l i t i c a l  power. The orthodox an a lysis  s tre sse s  the 
"sm okescreen" fu n ction  o f  id e o lo g y , and sees no r e la t io n  between id e ­
o logy  and p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n . It a lso  favors an assessment o f  the 1965 
pre-coup  s itu a t io n  which s tre sse s  the Army’ s monopoly o f  weapons to 
a ssert that the balance o f  power had never changed. A ll assessments 
which focus on the monopoly o f  weapons as the stron gest in d ica to r  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  power seem to evaluate the pre-coup  p eriod  with an ex post 
facto a n a ly t ica l b ia s . The apparent ease and sw iftn ess  with which the 
Communist Party was destroyed  a fte r  the October 1, 1965, coup, the 
strength  o f  the very heterogeneous c o a l i t io n  which p a r t ic ip a te d  and 
r e jo ic e d  in i t s  a n n ih ila t io n , and the lack  o f  re s is ta n ce  the party  
o f fe r e d  against i t s  f a t e - - a l l  these fa c ts  support the charges that the 
pre-coup p o l i t i c a l  o f fe n s iv e  o f  the PKI had m erely been a b lu f f  w ithout 
rea l substance, and that supreme power had always rested  with the Army.
Such an an a lysis  f a i l s  to p e r ce iv e , however, that the PKI-Sukarno 
stra tegy  had probably intended to keep the p o l i t i c a l  o f fe n s iv e  below a 
th resh old  o f  v io le n ce  in order that the Army would never have a chance 
to use i t s  guns. The Army’ s power o f  p h y s ica l co e rc ion  was only a 
p o te n tia l fo r c e ,  restra in ed  by the P re s id e n t ’ s au th ority  and the lack  
o f  a leg it im a te  p retex t to u t i l i z e  i t .  The Army’ s rea l s itu a t io n  in 
ea rly  1965 was not p o te n tia l dominance in  a m ilita ry  showdown, but 
rather was in creasin g  p o l i t i c a l  i s o la t io n ,  and--as the post-cou p  purges 
have a ff irm e d -- in tern a l d iv is io n s  and c o n f l i c t  with the other s e r v ic e s . 
Therefore pre-coup  Indonesian p o l i t i c s  cannot be understood in  terms 
o f  the d r a s t ic a l ly  changed p o l i t i c a l  con d ition s  which became e f f e c t iv e  
a fte r  October 1, 1965.
124. For Sukarno's fear of foreign subversion and the CIA, see note 60 above. He 
constantly reminded his listeners to read the following books about the CIA: 
Thomas B. Ross and David Wise, The Invisible Government (New York: Random 
House, 1964), Andrew Tully, CIA, The Inside Story (New York: Morrow, 1962), 
and Morris West, The Ambassador (New York: Morrow, 1965).
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The Indonesian post-coup power configuration was radically altered 
by the introduction of physical violence into the political contest.
The Army interpreted the coup attempt as a legitimate reason to use its 
force. The atmosphere of political competition and the inroads of the 
Left in the pre-coup period were nullified by the injection of weapons 
into the political struggle. The struggle was now conducted at a dif­
ferent level and with rules which mortally disfavored the PKI and 
Sukarno. In such a situation the pre-coup political trend could be 
literally revoked overnight, and it was made possible for the uncom­
mitted middle group of the population to determine the winner of the 
contest.
It cannot be denied, however, that the strength of the conserva­
tive forces had been substantial in the period of political offensive 
by the Left in the pre-coup months, although they were under increas­
ing pressures to adjust to the leftist trend of politics. The coali­
tion of anti-Communist, anti-Sukarno and anti-China forces which ral­
lied around the Army, the Islamic groups, the non-Communist students, 
intellectuals and technocrats, was an impressive force, which had 
largely offset the leftist gains in capital politics through counter­
actions, evasion or a stalemate in the outer regions. It is doubtful, 
however, whether the conservative forces would have, in the end, suc­
ceeded in winning over the middle ground of the population to their 
side. If the gradual changes had continued and Sukarno's authority 
had remained intact, it seems questionable whether the conservatives 
could have resisted the trend for good. The intervention of the coup 
reduces this question to mere speculation, but the continued strength 
of Sukarno in the political system till March 1966 and the hesitation 
of the Army to move against him despite his tarnished image, allows 
one to wonder whether the Army would have dared to move against him in 
a time when his authority had not been compromised and it had no 
legitimate pretext to interfere physically in politics.
My interpretation of Sukarno--allied with the Left and the PKI, 
seriously committed to Nasakom as a political ideal, and in the final 
phase of Guided Democracy genuinely interested in the progress and 
radical intensification of the revolution-- in short, is of a Radical 
rather than a Conservative. This viewpoint can be challenged from yet 
another perspective, which would assert that during the last stage of 
Guided Democracy Sukarno was no longer in full control and was used by 
the PKI for their own ends. Such a view sees Sukarno's alliance with 
the Left not as a conscious step on his part, but as a scheme of the 
PKI dependent on his naivete.
It seems to me that neither the interpretation of Sukarno as a 
"stooge" of the PKI (which would serve a definite political function), 
nor the more orthodox view of Sukarno as a conservative can stand the 
evidence of his consistent post-coup commitment to the PKI, Nasakom 
unity and the interpretation of the Indonesian Revolution as a leftist 
revolution. When, in the judgment of many observers, he could have re­
tained his position if he had sacrificed the PKI and his insistence on 
the revolution as a leftist one, he stubbornly defended both at the 
price of his own demise. 125 It has been said that prinziipientreue was
125. See Sukarno's post-coup speeches as published in the Penerbitan Chusus series
of the Information Department: especially Binalah Kesatuan dan Persatuan Nasional 
Progresif Revolusioner atas Dasar Pantja Azimat Revolusi (Oct. 23, 1965, P.C. 
No. 388); Marilah Kita bersama-sama menjelamatkan Revolusi kita (Oct. 27, 1965,
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one of Sukarno’s outstanding characteristics: His commitment to the
progressive-leftist character of the Indonesian Revolution was his 
last, highly principled decision. In very emotional speeches after 
the coup, he tried to stem the tide of reaction and murder sweeping 
the country. He defended the PKI and reminded his audiences repeatedly 
that the party had made many more sacrifices for Indonesian independence 
and the revolution than any other group, even his own nationalist 
group.126 He warned his countrymen that their eagerness to eliminate 
the PKI irrevocably shifted the Indonesian Revolution to the right.127 
He may have already comprehended that those forces responsible for the 
anti-PKI program were intent on completely transforming his vision of 
the Indonesian Revolution. Rather than become a puppet of the 
counterrevolution, he went down with his principles.
P.C. No. 389); Semua Golongan diminta agar tenang, Djangan membakar satu-sama- 
lainl (Nov. 6, 1965, P.C. No. 391); Kalau tidak k iri, bukan Revolusi Indonesia 
(Nov. 10, 1965, P.C. No. 393).
126. See his speech to the Bamunas (National Consultative Council of Private Enter­
prise) on February 21, 1966, Djakarta Domestic Service, Feb. 23, 1966.
127. See Sukarno’ s speech to the MPRS leadership in the Palace on December 6, 1965,
Bangsa Indonesia djangan sampai merobek-robek dirinja sendiril ( [Djakarta]: 
Departemen Penerangan R .I., Penerbitan Chusus No. 395, [1965]), p. 10, for a 
metaphor which he repeatedly used after the coup. He compared the situation 
in the country with the activity of people who want to catch a mouse and in 
the process burn down a whole house. But he made it  perfectly clear that he 
was not willing to join in arson against the house, the "house” of the Indone­
sian Revolution: "And this is what happened, brothers; the danger of people
wanting to punish the mice by burning our house. Well, i f  that is the case, 
brothers, I say frankly, without disguise, I refuse to join in burning our 
house, because I personally, together with others for more than forty years, 
have contributed everything I have for this house."
